The Effect of FAS 123R on Firms Risk: Evidence from Private Loan Contracts

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongqiang Chu ◽  
Tao Ma
Keyword(s):  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Private Loan

The Impact of Financial Covenants in Private Loan Contracts on Classification Shifting

2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (8) ◽  
pp. 3637-3653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun Fan ◽  
Wayne B. Thomas ◽  
Xiaoou Yu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Management Technique ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Special Items ◽  
Classification Shifting ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Debt Covenant ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Covenant Violations ◽  
Private Loan

This study examines whether firms with private loan contracts that contain debt covenants based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are more likely to misclassify core expenses as special items (i.e., classification shift). Misclassifying core expenses as income-decreasing special items allows the firm to increase EBITDA and thereby potentially avoid debt covenant violations. Consistent with our expectation, firms misclassify core expenses as special items when at least one EBITDA-related financial covenant is close to being violated. In addition, classification shifting is more prominent when financially distressed firms are close to violating at least one EBITDA-related covenant. Whereas prior research on classification shifting focuses primarily on equity market incentives (e.g., meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts), our study extends this research to private loan contracts to highlight that creditors also affect classification shifting. Classification shifting appears to be an additional earnings management technique used by managers to avoid debt covenant violations. This paper was accepted by Shivaram Rajgopal, accounting.

Blocking Block-Formation: Evidence from Private Loan Contracts

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian K. Akins ◽  
David De Angelis ◽  
Rustam Zufarov
Keyword(s):  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Block Formation ◽  
Private Loan

Financial Folly and Spain’s Black Legend

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Great Flexibility ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Historical Tradition ◽  
Black Legend ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
The Relationship

This epilogue argues that Castile was solvent throughout Philip II's reign. A complex web of contractual obligations designed to ensure repayment governed the relationship between the king and his bankers. The same contracts allowed great flexibility for both the Crown and bankers when liquidity was tight. The risk of potential defaults was not a surprise; their likelihood was priced into the loan contracts. As a consequence, virtually every banking family turned a profit over the long term, while the king benefited from their services to run the largest empire that had yet existed. The epilogue then looks at the economic history version of Spain's Black Legend. The economic history version of the Black Legend emerged from a combination of two narratives: a rich historical tradition analyzing the decline of Spain as an economic and military power from the seventeenth century onward, combined with new institutional analysis highlighting the unconstrained power of the monarch.

Lending to the Borrower from Hell

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
The United States ◽  
Philip Ii ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intelligent Model ◽  
New Evidence

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.

Delayed Repayment of Corporate Loans in the European Union: Can the Late Payment Directive be Applied to Loan Contracts?

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Magdalena Gruber
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Loan Contracts

Abstract This paper examines the Late Payment Directive of the European Union and seeks to answer the question of whether the provisions of the Directive apply to loan contracts in corporate transactions. The paper first describes and analyses the Late Pay­ment Directive and provides a comprehensive analysis of relevant arguments and legal sources. It then evaluates the different factors required by the Late Payment Directive and finally argues that the Late Payment Directive has to be applied to loan contracts and facility agreements, even if this is not explicitly foreseen in the Directive.

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