A Harmonized Approach Towards Capacity Adequacy in the EU Internal Electricity Market: Policy Options to Reconcile Unilateral Capacity Mechanisms.

Author(s):  
Bjjrn Verse
2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (7) ◽  
pp. 687-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blanca Moreno ◽  
María T García-Álvarez

Spain and Portugal are highly dependent on energy from abroad, importing more than 70% of all the energy they consume. This high energy dependence could involve important effects on the level and stability of their electricity prices as a half the gross electricity generated in both countries came from power stations using imported combustible fuels (such as natural gas, coal and oil). In general, changes in the prices of these fossil fuels can directly affect household electricity prices, since generation costs are likely to be transmitted through to the wholesale electricity market. Moreover, in the framework of the European Union Emission Trading System, electricity production technologies tend to incorporate their costs of carbon dioxide emission allowances in sale offers with the consequent increase of the electricity prices. The objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of fossil fuel costs and prices of carbon dioxide emission allowances in the EU on the Spanish and Portuguese electricity prices. With this aim, a maximum entropy econometric approach is used. The obtained results indicate that not only the price of imported gas are very important in explaining Spanish and Portuguese electricity prices but also the price of carbon dioxide emission allowances in the EU.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 125-144
Author(s):  
Ksenia Smyrnova

This paper follows a comparative approach to the analysis of collective dominance doctrine and practice in the EU and the enforcement practice in Ukraine. The aim of this paper is to assess the compliance of the Ukrainian competition authority’s (AMCU) analysis of the national electricity market with EU law enforcement practice. The latter arises from Ukraine’s wider duty to fulfil its international law obligation to comply with EU competition rules, based on Article 18 of the Treaty establishing the Energy Community also taking into account the interpretative criteria developed in EU case law (according to Article 94 of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU). Article 255 of the Association Agreement, which clearly provides for the use of the principle of transparency, non-discrimination and neutrality when complying with the procedures of fairness, justice and the right of defence, also illustrates the necessity of carrying out research in this field. The paper examines notions such as: the dominance doctrine, market power definition, economic strength and collective dominance in the EU enforcement practice. Special attention is placed on enforcement practice in the electricity market. Since the scrutinised market inquiry constitutes the first investigation into the Ukrainian electricity market, there is no national practice on this issue yet. For this reason, the analysis follows a wide comparative approach towards the principles of collective dominance in the electricity market in Ukraine. The paper concludes that the AMCU’s approach to the regulation of the electricity market in Ukraine confirms the necessity to reform the system of state regulation in the wholesale electricity market and in the market of services for electricity transmission. In order to develop competition in the electricity market, it is also necessary to change the system for tariff and pricing policy formation on the part of the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission of Ukraine and the Ministry of Energy and Coal-Mining Industry of Ukraine. Stressed is also the necessity to follow the approach and criteria of EU competition law with regard to the determination of market dominance. This requirement is stipulated by Ukraine’s international legal obligations arising from Articles 18 and 94 of the Treaty establishing the Energy Community and Article 255 of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.


Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter examines the European Union’s (EU’s) original decision to create a single market and the moves to complete the internal market—what became known as the single market programme—in the 1980s. The economic ideal of a common or single European market lies at the core of the EU. The decision to institute a drive to achieve a single internal market by the end of 1992 played a key role in the revival of European integration. The chapter first traces the development of internal market policy before discussing the record of implementation beyond 1992. It then considers recent policy developments in relation to the single market in the context of the Barroso (2005–14) and Juncker (2014–19) Commission presidencies. It also reviews the academic literature on the single market, focusing on the main explanations for its development and some key ideological or normative perspectives on its consequences, including political economy critiques.


Author(s):  
Roland Herrmann

SummaryThe objectives of this paper are (i) to assess the actual economic implications of the new European banana policy on prices, consumption and trade in Germany within a theoretical and quantitative analysis; (ii) to elaborate the welfare implications of the European banana market policy on the German banana market from the national compared with the EU’s point of view. The new European banana market policy led to the introduction of a tariff quota system on the formerly unprotected German banana market. This caused a substantial increase in German import prices for bananas, e. g. in 1994 by 95 % compared with the hypothetical situation without trade protection. Further consequences were a strong reduction of import demand and clearly rising import expenditures, by 22 % and 53 % respectively in 1994. The new banana protection on the German market caused substantial losses in consumer surplus: 1039 mill. DM in 1994, as well as deadweight losses. The size of the deadweight losses was clearly higher from the German than from the EU’s point of view. High quota rents of European traders and budgetary gains at the EU level compensated a substantial part of German consumers’ welfare losses at the EU level. This is much less the case for Germany, given the allocation of import licences in the European banana trade and the common financial system in the EU. Strong and untargeted redistributive consequences were induced by the new European banana policy even within the EU.


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