Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Oligopoly

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Leininger ◽  
Hamed Markazi Moghadam
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Asymmetric Oligopoly

Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability

2018 ◽  
Vol 96 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Leininger ◽  
Hamed Markazi Moghadam
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Asymmetric Oligopoly

On the Evolutionary Stability of Dispersal to Sink Habitats

1991 ◽  
Vol 137 (6) ◽  
pp. 907-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Morris
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Stability

scholarly journals MARKET COMPETITION, R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

2011 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 484-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUNICHIRO ISHIDA ◽  
TOSHIHIRO MATSUMURA ◽  
NORIAKI MATSUSHIMA
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Asymmetric Oligopoly

Long-Term Evolutionary Stability of Bacterial Endosymbiosis in Curculionoidea: Additional Evidence of Symbiont Replacement in the Dryophthoridae Family

2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 859-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cyrille Conord ◽  
Laurence Despres ◽  
Agnès Vallier ◽  
Séverine Balmand ◽  
Christian Miquel ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Stability

scholarly journals Politeness and reputation in cultural evolution

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Mühlenbernd ◽  
Sławomir Wacewicz ◽  
Przemysław Żywiczyński
Keyword(s):  
Language Use ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Social Image ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Politeness Strategies ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Cultural Evolutionary

AbstractPoliteness in conversation is a fascinating aspect of human interaction that directly interfaces language use and human social behavior more generally. We show how game theory, as a higher-order theory of behavior, can provide the tools to understand and model polite behavior. The recently proposed responsibility exchange theory (Chaudhry and Loewenstein in Psychol Rev 126(3):313–344, 2019) describes how the polite communications of thanking and apologizing impact two different types of an agent’s social image: (perceived) warmth and (perceived) competence. Here, we extend this approach in several ways, most importantly by adding a cultural-evolutionary dynamics that makes it possible to investigate the evolutionary stability of politeness strategies. Our analysis shows that in a society of agents who value status-related traits (such as competence) over reciprocity-related traits (such as warmth), both the less and the more polite strategies are maintained in cycles of cultural-evolutionary change.

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