The Microstructure of the US Property-Casualty Reinsurance Network: Performance Effects

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hua Chen ◽  
David Cummins ◽  
Tao Sun ◽  
Mary A. Weiss
1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 155-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Frystyk Nielsen ◽  
James Gettys ◽  
Anselm Baird-Smith ◽  
Eric Prud'hommeaux ◽  
Håkon Wium Lie ◽  
...  

2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 224-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W Steinfield ◽  
M Lynne Markus ◽  
Rolf T Wigand

Interorganizational Systems (IOS) can have influences that extend beyond the organizations that implement them. Much can be learned at the industry-level of analysis that might not be revealed in studies conducted at the organizational level of analysis. This article summarizes a case study of one industry - the US home mortgage industry - in order to illustrate three types of industry-level phenomena that surface when examining use of interorganizational IT-driven coordination systems: collective actions among industry participants, performance effects, and structural effects. Our discussion of case results distinguishes between industry outcomes that are the net result of the accumulation of organizational actions vs. outcomes where industry-level consequences are qualitatively different from what is observed at the organizational level.


2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
William C. Lesch ◽  
Bruce Byars

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


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