Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gal Cohensius ◽  
Ella Segev
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Bidding

scholarly journals Multi-Winner Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Single-Sided Auction Theoretic Modelling Approach with Sequential Bidding

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 602
Author(s):  
Monisha Devi ◽  
Nityananda Sarma ◽  
Sanjib K. Deka
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Communication Networks ◽  
Spectrum Sharing ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Radio Spectrum ◽  
Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sequential Bidding

Cognitive radio (CR) has evolved as a novel technology for overcoming the spectrum-scarcity problem in wireless communication networks. With its opportunistic behaviour for improving the spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables the desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize the idle spectrum owned by primary users. On sensing the spectrum to identify the idle frequency bands, proper spectrum-allocation mechanisms need to be designed to provide an effectual use of the radio resource. In this paper, we propose a single-sided sealed-bid sequential-bidding-based auction framework that extends the channel-reuse property in a spectrum-allocation mechanism to efficiently redistribute the unused channels. Existing auction designs primarily aim at maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue, due to which certain CR constraints remain excluded in their models. We address two such constraints, viz. the dynamics in spectrum opportunities and varying availability time of vacant channels, and formulate an allocation problem that maximizes the utilization of the radio spectrum. The auctioneer strategises winner determination based on bids collected from SUs and sequentially leases the unused channels, while restricting the channel assignment to a single-channel-multi-user allocation. To model the spectrum-sharing mechanism, we initially developed a group-formation algorithm that enables the members of a group to access a common channel. Furthermore, the spectrum-allocation and pricing algorithms are operated under constrained circumstances, which guarantees truthfulness in the model. An analysis of the simulation results and comparison with existing auction models revealed the effectiveness of the proposed approach in assigning the unexploited spectrum.

scholarly journals A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding*

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 1631-1665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kent D Daniel ◽  
David Hirshleifer
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Bidding

Alternative Strategies for Selling Land to the Highest Bidder

1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 817-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
P A Rogerson
Keyword(s):  
Waiting Times ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
A Priori Information ◽  
Rank Minimization ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Initial Information ◽  
Sequential Bidding ◽  
Priori Information

In this paper the properties of several models of sequential bidding behavior are evaluated. In particular, the returns to a seller who maximizes the probability of selling to the highest bidder are compared with the returns of a rank minimization strategy which is more conservative. The comparison reveals that the rank minimization strategy will generally lead to shorter waiting times, higher expected selling prices, and lower probabilities of receiving the worst bids. Both of these objectives assume that sellers have no initial information pertaining to the distribution of bid prices. This is in sharp contrast to the more usual assumption of complete information about the parameters of the distribution. The losses associated with not having a priori information on the number of bidders are also evaluated. Under such circumstances, sellers may adopt more conservative strategies, with the consequent result of shorter waiting times and lower expected prices.

Sequential bidding in auctions of construction contracts

2002 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dakshina G De Silva ◽  
Timothy Dunne ◽  
Georgia Kosmopoulou
Keyword(s):  
Construction Contracts ◽  
Sequential Bidding

Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gal Cohensius ◽  
Ella Segev
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
First Order ◽  
Uniform Distributions ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Expected Revenue ◽  
Sequential Bidding

AbstractWe study asymmetric first price auctions in which bidders place their bids sequentially, one after the other and only once. We show that, when bidders’ values are drawn from uniform distributions and are asymmetric, i.e., there is a strong bidder and a weak bidder (the strong bidder’s distribution first order stochastically dominates that of the weak bidder’s), the expected revenue in the sequential bidding first price auction (when the strong bidder bids first) may be higher than in the simultaneous bidding first price auction as well as the simultaneous bidding second price auction. The expected payoff of the weak bidder is also higher in the sequential first price auction. Therefore a seller interested in increasing revenue facing asymmetric bidders may find it beneficial to order them and let them bid sequentially instead of simultaneously.

scholarly journals A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kent D. Daniel ◽  
David A. Hirshleifer
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Bidding

A bayesian forecasting model for sequential bidding

1991 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 565-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. N. Attwell ◽  
J. Q. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Forecasting Model ◽  
Bayesian Forecasting ◽  
Sequential Bidding
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