scholarly journals Monotonic Allocation Schemes In Clan Games

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Voorneveld ◽  
Stef H. Tijs ◽  
Sofia Grahn
Keyword(s):  
Clan Games

scholarly journals Convex Games versus Clan Games

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodica Branzei ◽  
Dinko Dimitrov ◽  
Stef H. Tijs
Keyword(s):  
Convex Games ◽  
Clan Games

scholarly journals Multi-Choice Total Clan Games: Characterizations and Solution Concepts

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodica Branzei ◽  
Natividad Llorca ◽  
J. Sánchez Soriano ◽  
Stef H. Tijs
Keyword(s):  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Clan Games

scholarly journals CONVEX GAMES VERSUS CLAN GAMES

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (04) ◽  
pp. 363-372
Author(s):  
RODICA BRANZEI ◽  
DINKO DIMITROV ◽  
STEF TIJS
Keyword(s):  
Convex Games ◽  
Convex Game ◽  
Weber Set ◽  
Core Elements ◽  
Clan Games

In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.

DETERMINING THE NUCLEOLUS OF COMPROMISE STABLE GAMES

2015 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 488-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGSHUANG HOU ◽  
THEO DRIESSEN
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Coalitional Game ◽  
Coalitional Games ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Dual Representation ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Clan Games ◽  
Big Boss Games ◽  
Characteristic Function Form

The main goal is to illustrate that the so-called indirect function of a cooperative game in characteristic function form is applicable to determine the nucleolus for a subclass of coalitional games called compromise stable transferable utility (TU) games. In accordance with the Fenchel–Moreau theory on conjugate functions, the indirect function is known as the dual representation of the characteristic function of the coalitional game. The key feature of a compromise stable TU game is the coincidence of its core with a box prescribed by certain upper and lower core bounds. For the purpose of the determination of the nucleolus, we benefit from the interrelationship between the indirect function and the prekernel of coalitional TU games. The class of compromise stable TU games contains the subclasses of clan games, big boss games and $1$- and $2$-convex $n$-person TU games. As an adjunct, this paper reports the indirect function of clan games for the purpose of determining their nucleolus.

scholarly journals Fuzzy clan games and bi-monotonic allocation rules

2004 ◽  
Vol 146 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.H Tijs ◽  
M.R Brânzei ◽  
S Muto ◽  
S Ishihara ◽  
E Fukuda
Keyword(s):  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Clan Games

Clan games

1989 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jos Potters ◽  
René Poos ◽  
Stef Tijs ◽  
Shigeo Muto
Keyword(s):  
Clan Games

Multi-choice clan games and their core

Top ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Branzei ◽  
N. Llorca ◽  
J. Sánchez-Soriano ◽  
S. Tijs
Keyword(s):  
Clan Games
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