Evaluating the Impact of Cybersecurity Information Sharing on Cyber Incidents and Their Consequences

Author(s):  
Matthew H. Fleming ◽  
Eric Goldstein ◽  
John K Roman
2015 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 127-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Costantino ◽  
Giulio Di Gravio ◽  
Ahmed Shaban ◽  
Massimo Tronci

2008 ◽  
Vol 35 (11) ◽  
pp. 3657-3670 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Kelepouris ◽  
Panayiotis Miliotis ◽  
Katerina Pramatari

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (05) ◽  
pp. 1350020 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHUPING LIU ◽  
QIUHONG ZHAO ◽  
SHOUYANG WANG ◽  
JIANMING SHI

This paper investigates the impact of partial information sharing in a three-echelon supply chain. Partial information sharing means that information sharing occurs only between the distributor and the retailer, but not between the distributor and the manufacturer. This paper contributes to the literature by summarizing the circumstances in which information sharing between the retailer and the distributor benefits the manufacturer. In addition, our study points out that such information sharing does not always bring benefits to the manufacturer and that in some cases the information sharing may harm the manufacturer. We explain the reasons why this can happen and give managerial intuition for our results. Using numerical analysis, we illustrate the impact of partial information sharing on the agents in the supply chain with the change of the autoregressive coefficient in the demand process.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Shanshan Wang ◽  
Tian Luo ◽  
Daofang Chang

This paper examines the influence of information forecast accuracy on the profits of the supply chain under the circumstance of a multichannel apparel supply chain. Due to the emergence of multichannel, customer showrooming behavior is becoming increasingly prevalent. For example, consumers usually buy garments online after experiencing the service in the traditional bricks and mortar in the clothing industry. Meanwhile, there are often information barriers between the manufacturer and the retailer, which will affect enterprise decision-making. To solve these problems, this paper mainly investigates the information sharing and customer showrooming phenomenon, which includes four models: no information sharing without showrooming model (NN), information sharing without showrooming model (SN), no information sharing with showrooming model (NS), and information sharing with showrooming model (SS). The numerical analysis shows that under the impact of the forecast error, information sharing between channel members is more favorable than no information sharing when parameters satisfy certain conditions. From the perspectives of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole supply chain, customer showrooming behavior will bring them less profit. These conclusions mean that the retailer should share information with the manufacturer and adjust their service level and sales price to alleviate the effect of showrooming.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xiaheng Zhang ◽  
Zekai Lin ◽  
Lin Xiao

In the two-stage supply chain model, the incentive effect to the supplier’s sharing of demand information and performance evaluation and the effect of various parameters on the incentive effect of the supply chain are studied through a multiagent simulation model constructed for the purpose. It is found that the incentive coefficient of demand information-sharing degree, the number of selected suppliers, the order allocation coefficient, and the order proportion are positively related to the incentive effect of demand information sharing. So, the greater the demand information sharing is, the greater the impact of these parameters on the incentive effect is. Based on the demand information sharing, the supplier performance evaluation rules are shared, and when the actual evaluation rules are inconsistent with the supplier’s expectations, the incentive effect is further enhanced. Other parameters do not affect the incentive effect of demand information sharing and performance evaluation rule sharing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 2943-2964
Author(s):  
Xudong Lin ◽  
Xiaoli Huang ◽  
Shuilin Liu ◽  
Yulin Li ◽  
Hanyang Luo ◽  
...  

With the rapid development of information technology, digital platforms can collect, utilize, and share large amounts of specific information of consumers. However, these behaviors may endanger information security, thus causing privacy concerns among consumers. Considering the information sharing among firms, this paper constructs a two-period duopoly price competition Hotelling model, and gives insight into the impact of three different levels of privacy regulations on industry profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results show that strong privacy protection does not necessarily make consumers better off, and weak privacy protection does not necessarily hurt consumers. Information sharing among firms will lead to strong competitive effects, which will prompt firms to lower the price for new customers, thus damaging the profits of firms, and making consumers’ surplus higher. The level of social welfare under different privacy regulations depends on consumers’ product-privacy preference, and the cost of information coordination among firms. With the cost of information coordination among firms increasing, it is only in areas where consumers have greater privacy preferences that social welfare may be optimal under the weak regulation.


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