Do Policy Messengers Matter? Majority Opinion Writers as Policy Cues in Public 'Buy In' of Supreme Court Decisions

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott S. Boddery ◽  
Jeff Yates
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
Supreme Court Decisions

The Legacy of the Magna Carta in Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Detainees' Rights

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (03) ◽  
pp. 483-486
Author(s):  
Robert Pallitto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
Magna Carta ◽  
History Of ◽  
Supreme Court Decisions ◽  
Military Commissions

The legacy of the Magna Carta is apparent in the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding detainees' rights. Asked to evaluate strong claims of executive power, the Court has had occasion to consider the origin and scope of habeas corpus, which many scholars see as a product of the Magna Carta. The majority opinion inBoumedienev.Bush(2008) traced the history of the writ of habeas corpus back to the Magna Carta and relied on that lineage to rule that Guantanamo detainees were entitled to petition for habeas corpus, even though Congress had explicitly denied them that right in the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA) and the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act (DTA).

scholarly journals Case Selection and Supreme Court Pivots

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Sasso ◽  
Gleason Judd
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
Case Selection ◽  
Supreme Court Decisions ◽  
Median Justice

How does the Rule of Four affect Supreme Court decisions? We show two effects of changing a ``hearing pivot" justice who is decisive for case selection. First, as this justice becomes more extreme, the court hears a larger set of policies. That is, as the hearing pivot becomes more conservative, the court hears more cases with liberal status quo precedents. Second, as the hearing pivot becomes more extreme, dispositional majorities shrink and rulings are more polarized. When the median justice becomes more extreme without changing the hearing pivot, rulings become more extreme as the majority opinion shifts. Yet, the set of cases heard changes very little. Finally, we show that changing non-pivotal justices also affects case selection. If an extreme justice is replaced with someone even more extreme, this may expand the gridlock interval. Extreme justices pull the bargaining policy away from the hearing pivot, thus making status quo precedents more appealing.

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