scholarly journals An Analysis of Auditors' Going-Concern Reporting Accuracy in Private Firms

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kris Hardies ◽  
Marie-Laure Vandenhaute ◽  
Diane Breesch
2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 117-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kris Hardies ◽  
Marie-Laure Vandenhaute ◽  
Diane Breesch

SYNOPSIS The accuracy of audit reports is often viewed as a signal for audit quality. Prior research shows that in the context of going-concern reporting in audit markets dominated by public firms, some auditors are more accurate than others (e.g., Big N firms). This study is the first large-scale study that investigates going-concern reporting accuracy in an audit market dominated by private firms. The threat of reputation and litigation costs incentivizes auditors to report accurately in markets dominated by public firms, but such incentives are largely absent in markets dominated by private firms. Hence, reporting accuracy in such markets might not vary across auditors. Our main analysis is based on a sample of 1,375 Belgian firms that ceased to exist within one year from the financial statement date. Our results show that the frequency of Type II misclassification does not vary across auditor types (Big 4 versus non-Big 4, audit firm and partner industry specialists versus non-specialists, more experienced versus less experienced, and female versus male auditors). Overall, these results cast doubt on the existence of quality differences among auditors in audit markets dominated by private firms.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

Prior research suggests that the Big 4 audit firms are of higher quality than are non-Big 4 firms. However, existing tests for an association between audit firm size and reporting accuracy are indirect and provide mixed results. Our study extends this line of research by examining whether the Big 4 audit firms exhibit higher quality reporting by having fewer “audit-reporting errors” in the context of issuing going-concern modified reports. Our analyses examine both types of going-concern reporting errors (i.e., type I errors—modified opinions rendered to subsequently viable clients; and type II errors—unmodified opinions rendered to subsequently bankrupt clients) over an 11-year period. We also examine reporting error rate differences between the national second-tier firms and regional/local third-tier firms. Our findings indicate that both type I and type II error rates for Big 4 audit firms are significantly lower compared to non-Big 4 firms. In contrast, we find no significant differences between the national second-tier and regional/local third-tier audit firms with respect to either type of reporting error. Our results provide evidence about a Big 4 audit quality difference in reporting on client's going-concern problems.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liesbeth Bruynseels ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Marleen Willekens

SUMMARY: In this paper we examine whether there is auditor differentiation through industry specialization and audit methodology in judging the adequacy of mitigating management actions as implemented by financially distressed companies. Using a sample of U.S. companies from manufacturing industries (SIC 20–39) that went bankrupt between 1999–2002, we find evidence that specialist auditors are more likely to issue a going-concern opinion for soon-to-be bankrupt companies when management undertakes strategic turnaround initiatives, relative to non-specialist auditors. Interestingly, and counter to our expectations, we find that audit firms that use a business risk audit methodology are less likely to issue a going-concern opinion for a firm that subsequently goes bankrupt if the client has undertaken operating initiatives to mitigate financial distress. Finally, we also find very strong evidence that all auditors, irrespective of type, are less likely to issue a going-concern opinion for clients that subsequently go bankrupt when the client has plans to raise cash in the short term.


2011 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1041-1059 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Carey ◽  
Stuart Kortum ◽  
Robyn Moroney

2017 ◽  
pp. 83-99
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Mafrolla ◽  
Viola Nobili

This paper investigates whether and at what extent private firms reduce the quality of their accruals in order to signal a better portrait to the bank and obtain new or larger bank loans. We measure earnings discretionary accruals of a sample of Italian private firms, testing whether new and larger bank loans are associated with a higher (lower) quality of earnings in borrowers' financial reporting. We study bank loan levels and changes and how they impact discretionary accruals and found that, surprisingly, private firms' discretionary accruals are systematically positively affected by an increase in bank loans, although they are negatively affected by the credit worthiness rating assigned to the borrowers. We find that the monitoring role of the banking system with regard to the adoption of discretionary accruals is effective only when the loan is very large. This paper may have implications for policy-makers as it contributes to the understanding of the shortcomings of the banking regulatory system. This is an extremely relevant issue since the excessive amount of non-performing loans held by Italian banks recently threatened the stability of the European Banking Union as a whole.


Author(s):  
Phung Anh Thu ◽  
Nguyen Vinh Khuong

The investigation was conducted to contribute empirical evidence of the association between going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms on the Vietnam stock market. Based on data from 279 companies listed on the HNX and HOSE exchanges in Vietnam for the period 2009-2015, the quantitative research. Results found that the relationship between the going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms. Research results are significant for investors, regulators to the transparency of financial reporting information. Keywords Going concern, financial reporting quality, listed firms References Agrawal, K., & Chatterjee, C. (2015). Earnings management and financial distress: Evidence from India. Global Business Review, 16(5_suppl), 140S-154S.Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 511–529.Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 99–126.Charitou, A., Lambertides, N., & Trigeorgis, L. (2007a). Earnings behaviour of financially distressed firms: The role of institutional ownership. Abacus, 43(3), 271–296.Chen, Y., Chen, C., & Huang, S. (2010). An appraisal of financially distressed companies’ earnings management: Evidence from listed companies in China. Pacific Accounting Review, 22(1), 22–41Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review, 77, 35-59.DeFond, M., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1), 145–176.DeFond, M.L., & Park, C.W. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 115–139.Dichev, I., & Skinner, D. (2004). Large sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(4), 1091–1123.Đinh Thị Thu T., Nguyễn Vĩnh K. (2016). Tác động của hành vi điều chỉnh thu nhập đến khả năng hoạt động liên tục trong kế toán: Nghiên cứu thực nghiệm cho các doanh nghiệp niêm yết tại Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển khoa học và công nghệ, Quí 3, tr.96-108.Đỗ Thị Vân Trang (2015). Các mô hình đánh giá chất lượng báo cáo tài chính, Tạp chí chứng khoán Việt Nam, 200, tr 18-21.Habib, A., Uddin Bhuiyan, B., & Islam, A. (2013). Financial distress, earnings management and market pricing of accruals during the global financial crisis. Managerial Finance, 39(2), 155-180.Jaggi, B., & Lee, P. (2002). Earnings management response to debt covenant violations and debt restructuring. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 17(4), 295–324.Kasznik, R., (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of accounting research, 37(1), pp.57-81.Lu, J. (1999). An empirical study of earnings management by loss-making listed Chinese companies. KuaijiYanjiu (Accounting Research), (9), 25–35.McNichols, M.F. and Stubben, S.R., (2008). Does earnings management affect firms’ investment decisions?. The accounting review, 83(6), pp.1571-1603.Selahudin, N.F., Zakaria, N.B., & Sanusi, Z.M. (2014). Remodelling the earnings management with the appear- ance of leverage, financial distress and free cash flow: Malaysia and Thailand evidences. Journal of Applied Sciences, 14(21), 2644–2661.Skinner, D.J., & Sloan, R. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2/3), 289–312.Sweeney, A.P., (1994). Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 17(3): 281-308.Trần Thị Thùy Linh, Mai Hoàng Hạnh (2015). Chất lượng báo cáo tài chính và kỳ hạn nợ ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả hoạt động của doanh nghiệp Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển kinh tế, 10, tr.27-50.Trương Thị Thùy Dương (2017). Nâng cao chất lượng báo cáo tài chính công ty đại chúng, Tạp chí tài chính, 1(3), tr.55-56.Uwuigbe, Ranti, Bernard, (2015). Assessment of the effects of firm’s characteristics on earnings management of listed firms in Nigeria, Asian Economic and Financial Review,5(2):218-228.


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