Do Multiple Large Shareholders Play a Corporate Governance Role? Evidence from East Asia

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Najah Attig ◽  
Sadok El Ghoul ◽  
Omrane Guedhami
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Large Shareholders

scholarly journals The Effect of Multiple Large Shareholders on Banks’ Profitability and Risk

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1888
Author(s):  
Maria Gaia Soana ◽  
Laura Barbieri ◽  
Andrea Lippi ◽  
Simone Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Bank Ownership ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

The wide-ranging academic literature on corporate governance in the banking sector includes only a few studies on bank ownership and, specifically, on the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate structure. This paper reports an investigation into the presence of multiple large shareholders and their influence on profitability and risk in the long-term, considering a sample of 697 U.S. and European listed commercial banks from 2008 to 2018. It was found that the number of large and institutional shareholders has a positive impact on profitability, but no effect on risk. However, long-term ownership by multiple large shareholders contributes to decreasing risk in banks.

Dividends and Expropriation

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mara Faccio ◽  
Larry H. P Lang ◽  
Leslie Young
Keyword(s):  
East Asia ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Predominant Form ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Crony Capitalism ◽  
Top Manager

Whereas most U.S. corporations are widely held, the predominant form of ownership in East Asia is control by a family, which often supplies a top manager. These features of “crony capitalism” are actually more pronounced in Western Europe. In both regions, the salient agency problem is expropriation of outside shareholders by controlling shareholders. Dividends provide evidence on this. Group-affiliated corporations in Europe pay higher dividends than in Asia, dampening insider expropriation. Dividend rates are higher in Europe, but lower in Asia, when there are multiple large shareholders, suggesting that they dampen expropriation in Europe, but exacerbate it in Asia. (JEL G34, G35)

scholarly journals Transaksi Pihak Berelasi: Kompensasi Manajemen Kunci, Kinerja Akuntansi, dan Multiple Large Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 877
Author(s):  
Gandy Wahyu Maulana Zulma ◽  
Fitri Chairunnisa ◽  
Azolla Degita Azis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Executive Management ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Research Period ◽  
Positive Effect

The aim of this study is to examine whether multiple large shareholders held by the company can affect the relation between accounting performance and executive compensation, using panel data of all publicly company in Indonesia (except financialand mining industries) with the research period 2017-2019. The result shows that the existence of 2nd largest shareholders that owns more than 10% stocks and also if the board has representation from 2nd largest shareholders in the company, it can reduce the positive effect of accounting performance to executive compensation. This research findings could be as an additional literature in financial accounting and corporate governance area, and also for practitioners in Indonesia that if a firm has good controlling function from multiple large shareholders, it can reduce the opportunistic discretion from executive management if the company has performance evaluation based on earnings.

Large shareholders and corporate governance

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 297-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Frantz ◽  
Norvald Instefjord
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Large Shareholders

When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders: The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments

2006 ◽  
Vol 61 (6) ◽  
pp. 2975-3007 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGHUI LI ◽  
FARIBORZ MOSHIRIAN ◽  
PETER KIEN PHAM ◽  
JASON ZEIN
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Large Shareholders
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