Large Shareholders, Corporate Governance and Corporate Risk Taking: Evidence from East Asia

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dev R. Mishra
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Risk

International Evidence About the Influence of Large Shareholders on Corporate Risk Taking

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Maria Diez Esteban ◽  
Conrado Diego García Gómez ◽  
Félix J. López-Iturriaga
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
International Evidence ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Risk

Does corporate governance influence corporate risk-taking? Evidence from the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS)

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 105-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard ◽  
Shenghui Tong ◽  
Young Sang Kim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Risk

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French Family Firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Pascal Nguyen ◽  
Wael Rouatbi
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
French Family ◽  
Corporate Risk

The effects of ownership concentration and corporate governance on corporate risk-taking

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seksak Jumreornvong ◽  
Sirimon Treepongkaruna ◽  
Panu Prommin ◽  
Pornsit Jiraporn
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Instrumental Variable Analysis ◽  
Developed Economies ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Corporate Risk ◽  
Variable Analysis

Purpose This study aims to investigate the effects of ownership concentration and corporate governance on the extent of risk-taking in an important emerging economy – Thailand. Design/methodology/approach The results are corroborated by additional analysis, including an instrumental-variable analysis and propensity score matching. Findings Large owners are under-diversified and are thus more vulnerable to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, they tend to advocate less risky corporate policies and strategies. Consistent with this notion, the authors find that more concentrated ownership induces firms to take significantly less risk. Originality/value Ownership in Thai firms is substantially more concentrated than that in developed economies, providing a unique opportunity to study the effect of highly concentrated ownership on risk-taking.

CEO power, corporate risk taking and role of large shareholders

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junaid Haider ◽  
Hong-Xing Fang
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Dynamic Panel Data ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Total Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Risk ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether a powerful chief executive officer (CEO) impacts corporate risk taking in the distinctive institutional and market setting of China? Second, in case such relationship exists, the paper further aims to investigate whether the presence of large shareholders affects it, and finally, whether this effect of large shareholders varies in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). Design/methodology/approach The authors have used a sample of 1,502 Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Sample period is 2008-2013. Besides conventional fixed-effect regression, dynamic panel data estimation (generalized method of moments) is applied to address the potential endogeneity. Findings The results show that CEO power is negatively related with corporate risk taking in two risk proxies, i.e. total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Second, the presence of large shareholders significantly affects this relationship, but does not change the primary negative relationship between CEO power and corporate risk taking. Finally, the results show that the relationship between CEO power and corporate risk taking is different in SOEs and NSOEs. The findings of this paper contend the organizational and behavioral theory viewpoint that individual decisions are more extreme. Practical implications This study provides useful implication for policymakers and suggests that while evaluating CEO’s performance, institutional and market settings should be considered. Originality/value This study provides new insights on the impact of CEO power on corporate risk taking under the two distinctive features in a developing country, i.e. presence of large shareholders and state-owned enterprises.

Board composition and corporate risk-taking: a review of listed firms from Germany and the USA

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 526-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahid Irshad Younas ◽  
Christian Klein ◽  
Thorsten Trabert ◽  
Bernhard Zwergel
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Corporate Risk ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Corporate governance is a crucial factor when considering excessive corporate risk-taking. Since corporate boards play such an important role in corporate governance, the purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of board composition and further board characteristics on excessive corporate risk-taking. Design/methodology/approach This study investigates listed firms from Germany and the USA from 2004 to 2015 based on data from Thomson Reuters Data Stream. The authors apply the fixed effect and random effect estimation method to demonstrate the impact of board composition on corporate risk-taking. Findings This study provides empirical evidence that an increase in the proportion of independent directors is associated with less corporate risk-taking. These effects are stronger among German firms. Lastly, the effects of board size and audit committee effectiveness (AUCE) on risk-taking have mixed results. Research limitations/implications The results favor continued efforts to strengthen the composition of corporate boards and improve the effectiveness of audit committees to curb unhealthy corporate risk-taking. The recommendations from the research will provide regulators and corporate management with the necessary information needed to design an appropriate independent board structure, and board size (BOSI). The research will, furthermore, fortify the indispensability of financial experts on audit committees. Originality/value This study contributes to the agency theory debate with these findings. Stronger board independence enables a better monitoring of the CEO, which leads to decision making based on a more appropriate level of risk.

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