scholarly journals Is Capital Mobility Good for Public Good Provision?

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregor Schwerhoff ◽  
Ottmar Edenhofer
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Good For ◽  
Good Provision

scholarly journals Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block

2002 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panos Hatzipanayotou ◽  
Costas Hadjiyiannis ◽  
Michael S. Michael
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Good Provision

scholarly journals Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Public Good Provision within a Trading Block

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panagiotis (Panos) Hatzipanayotou (Xatzipanagiotou) ◽  
Costas Hadjiyiannis ◽  
Michael S. Michael
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Good Provision

scholarly journals Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
David Jimenez-Gomez
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Network Topology ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Good Provision

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.

scholarly journals The Evolution of Networks and Local Public Good Provision: A Potential Approach

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 55
Author(s):  
Markus Kinateder ◽  
Luca Paolo Merlino
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Potential Game ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Local Public Good ◽  
Steady State Distribution ◽  
State Distribution ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Split Graphs ◽  
Good Provision

In this paper, we propose a game in which each player decides with whom to establish a costly connection and how much local public good is provided when benefits are shared among neighbors. We show that, when agents are homogeneous, Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs. Additionally, we show that the game is a potential game, even when we introduce heterogeneity along several dimensions. Using this result, we introduce stochastic best reply dynamics and show that this admits a unique and stationary steady state distribution expressed in terms of the potential function of the game. Hence, even if the set of Nash equilibria is potentially very large, the long run predictions are sharp.

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