Asymmetric Information and Unobserved Heterogeneity in the Accident Insurance

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Spindler
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
Accident Insurance

University Dropout

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 134-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel C. Voelkle ◽  
Nicolas Sander
Keyword(s):  
Grade Point Average ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
School Grade ◽  
Grade Point ◽  
High School Grade ◽  
Hands On ◽  
University Dropout ◽  
The Individual ◽  
A Prospective Study

University dropout is a politically and economically important factor. While a number of studies address this issue cross-sectionally by analyzing different cohorts, or retrospectively via questionnaires, few of them are truly longitudinal and focus on the individual as the unit of interest. In contrast to these studies, an individual differences perspective is adopted in the present paper. For this purpose, a hands-on introduction to a recently proposed structural equation (SEM) approach to discrete-time survival analysis is provided ( Muthén & Masyn, 2005 ). In a next step, a prospective study with N = 1096 students, observed across four semesters, is introduced. As expected, average university grade proved to be an important predictor of future dropout, while high-school grade-point average (GPA) yielded no incremental predictive validity but was completely mediated by university grade. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, three latent classes could be identified with differential predictor-criterion relations, suggesting the need to pay closer attention to the composition of the student population.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Migration and the Internet

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas John Cooke ◽  
Ian Shuttleworth
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Information And Communication Technologies ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
Panel Study ◽  
The United States ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
Using Data ◽  
And Migration ◽  
Dynamics Models

It is widely presumed that information and communication technologies, or ICTs, enable migration in several ways; primarily by reducing the costs of migration. However, a reconsideration of the relationship between ICTs and migration suggests that ICTs may just as well hinder migration; primarily by reducing the costs of not moving.  Using data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, models that control for sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity indicate a strong negative effect of ICT use on inter-state migration within the United States. These results help to explain the long-term decline in internal migration within the United States.

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