A Continuous-Time Model of Strategic Trading Under Asymmetric Information

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Guo ◽  
Hui Ou-Yang
2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge A. Chan-Lau

This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.


2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 356-375
Author(s):  
Dale L. Domian ◽  
Marie D. Racine ◽  
Craig A. Wilson

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