Does Expectation Setting Condition Retrospective Voting?

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil A. Malhotra ◽  
Yotam M. Margalit
Keyword(s):  
Retrospective Voting

The Theory of Conditional Retrospective Voting: Does the Presidential Record Matter Less in Open-Seat Elections?

2010 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 1083-1095 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Campbell ◽  
Bryan J. Dettrey ◽  
Hongxing Yin
Keyword(s):  
Retrospective Voting ◽  
Open Seat

Challenger Entry and Voter Learning

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
SANFORD C. GORDON ◽  
GREGORY A. HUBER ◽  
DIMITRI LANDA
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Retrospective Voting ◽  
Positive Assessment ◽  
Threat Of Entry ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Different Levels

We develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents, in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters. Given incumbent failure in office, challenger entry is more likely, but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed. At the same time, challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter's positive assessment of incumbent qualifications. How a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running, depending on the electoral environment. The model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting, the incumbency advantage, and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare, while pointing to new interpretations of, and future avenues for, empirical research on elections.

scholarly journals Retrospective Voting and the Polarization of Available Alternatives

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Stiers ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Performance Evaluations ◽  
Retrospective Voting ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Ideological Polarization ◽  
Clarity Of Responsibility ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Comparative Study

AbstractGovernment cohesiveness is known to moderate retrospective voting. While previous work on this topic has focused on characteristics of the government, we build on the literature on clarity of responsibility and the literature on valence to argue that the extent to which government and opposition are ideologically distinct also moderates retrospective voting. Two alternative expectations follow from these two theoretical perspectives. While the clarity of responsibility framework leads to the expectation that a larger difference between government and opposition will strengthen retrospective voting, the valence literature presumes that retrospective voting is stronger when ideological differences are small. Using the data of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project, we find evidence that is in line with the clarity of responsibility framework: the higher the degree of ideological polarization between government and opposition, the larger the effect of retrospective performance evaluations on the vote.

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