Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duarte Brito ◽  
Ricardo Ribeiro ◽  
Helder Vasconcelos
2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-212
Author(s):  
Tommaso Valletti ◽  
Hans Zenger

AbstractOn the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this article provides an overview of the state of economic analysis of unilateral effects in mergers with differentiated products. Drawing on our experience with merger enforcement in Europe, we discuss both static and dynamic competition, with a special emphasis on the calibration of competitive effects. We also discuss the role of market shares and structural presumptions in differentiated product markets.


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 82-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Man Dang ◽  
Darren Henry ◽  
Xiangkang Yin ◽  
Thuy Anh Vo

2006 ◽  
Vol 334 (7) ◽  
pp. 414-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noël Challamel ◽  
Damien Halm ◽  
André Dragon

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-367
Author(s):  
Yangsoo Jin

Abstract The price effects of a partial acquisition may be far more complex than those of a full merger. The discussion on this issue, however, has not been well developed in Asian countries, including Korea. However, a partial acquisition case occurred in Korea in which Essilor intended to acquire fifty-percent shares of its competitor, DM Optical. In this paper, we modify and reorganize theories of upward pricing pressure (UPP) in partial acquisitions and apply them to this case. This paper, therefore, intends not only to initiate a discussion, but also to suggest an exemplary method to conduct UPP analysis in partial acquisition environments. Specifically, it will contribute to methodological advances by analyzing the case in a fashion that circumvents limitations of time and data, the main obstacles merger reviewers often face, in practice.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document