CORPORATE COMBINATIONS OR FAILED ACQUISITION ATTEMPTS: PARTIAL ACQUISITIONS BY POSNER AND NON‐POSNER FIRMS.

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Rosenstein
Keyword(s):  
Partial Acquisitions

Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duarte Brito ◽  
Ricardo Ribeiro ◽  
Helder Vasconcelos
Keyword(s):  
Unilateral Effects ◽  
Partial Acquisitions

Target corporate governance, acquirers' location choices, and partial acquisitions

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 82-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Man Dang ◽  
Darren Henry ◽  
Xiangkang Yin ◽  
Thuy Anh Vo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Location Choices ◽  
Partial Acquisitions

Upward Pricing Pressure in Partial Acquisitions: Application to the Essilor Case

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-367
Author(s):  
Yangsoo Jin
Keyword(s):  
Asian Countries ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
Partial Acquisitions ◽  
Partial Acquisition

Abstract The price effects of a partial acquisition may be far more complex than those of a full merger. The discussion on this issue, however, has not been well developed in Asian countries, including Korea. However, a partial acquisition case occurred in Korea in which Essilor intended to acquire fifty-percent shares of its competitor, DM Optical. In this paper, we modify and reorganize theories of upward pricing pressure (UPP) in partial acquisitions and apply them to this case. This paper, therefore, intends not only to initiate a discussion, but also to suggest an exemplary method to conduct UPP analysis in partial acquisition environments. Specifically, it will contribute to methodological advances by analyzing the case in a fashion that circumvents limitations of time and data, the main obstacles merger reviewers often face, in practice.

scholarly journals Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration

2009 ◽  
Vol 165 (3) ◽  
pp. 508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Charléty ◽  
Marie-Cécile Fagart ◽  
Saïd Souam
Keyword(s):  
Market Concentration ◽  
Partial Acquisitions ◽  
Real Market

Large outside blockholders as monitors: Evidence from partial acquisitions

2008 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun W. Park ◽  
Zekiye Selvili ◽  
Moon H. Song
Keyword(s):  
Partial Acquisitions

Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure, and Foreclosure

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadav Levy ◽  
Yossi Spiegel ◽  
David Gilo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Partial Acquisitions

We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance. (JEL D21, D43, G34, L13, L22)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document