scholarly journals Securities Litigation Risk for Foreign Companies Listed in the U.S.

Author(s):  
Beiting Cheng ◽  
Suraj Srinivasan ◽  
Gwen Yu
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1307-1316
Author(s):  
N.E. Petrovskaya ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 631-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharad C. Asthana ◽  
K. K. Raman ◽  
Hongkang Xu

SYNOPSIS We examine why U.S.-listed foreign companies choose to have a U.S.-based (rather than home country-based) Big N firm as their principal auditor for SEC reporting purposes and the effects of that choice for audit fees and earnings quality. We find that the likelihood of the Big N principal auditor being U.S.-based is decreasing in client size and the level of investor protection in the home country, and increasing in the proportion of income earned outside the home country. We also find compelling evidence that U.S.-based Big N auditors are associated with higher-quality earnings (albeit for a higher fee), despite two factors—the greater distance between the U.S.-based (vis-à-vis home country-based) Big N auditor and the client, and the likelihood that much of the audit work is done outside the U.S.—which potentially could lower the earnings quality of the U.S.-listed foreign client when the Big N principal auditor is U.S.-based. Overall, our study suggests that the higher fees associated with a U.S.-based Big N principal auditor is not just price protection; rather, U.S.-based Big N principal auditors are also improving the financial reporting environment by reporting higher-quality audited earnings for their U.S.-listed foreign clients. JEL Classifications: L11; L15; M42.


2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 251-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Arena ◽  
Brandon Julio

AbstractThe risk of securities class action litigation alters corporate savings and investment policy. Firms with greater exposure to securities litigation hold significantly more cash in anticipation of future settlements and other related costs. The result is due to firms accumulating cash in anticipation of lawsuits and not a consequence of plaintiffs targeting firms with high cash levels. The market value of cash is lower for firms exposed to litigation risk. Corporate investment decisions are also affected by litigation risk, as firms reduce capital expenditures in response. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and possible spurious temporal effects.


2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl L. Brown ◽  
Susan Z. Shu ◽  
Billy S. Soo ◽  
Gregory M. Trompeter

SUMMARY Although prior literature has suggested that independent audits provide an implicit form of insurance against investor losses (the “insurance hypothesis”), it has been challenging to isolate the “insurance” effect. In this paper, we use a unique setting to examine this effect. In 2002, KPMG was investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice in relation to tax shelters sold by the firm. From then until early 2005, several news reports suggested that KPMG would be indicted and suffer potentially the same fate as Arthur Andersen. However, in August of 2005 KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, which ended widespread speculation of an impending federal indictment against the accounting firm. Because the investigation centered around tax services offered by the firm, we argue that the circumstances surrounding the investigation and settlement provide a natural setting to test the insurance value provided by auditors. We show that KPMG audit client firms experienced significant negative abnormal market returns when it appeared more likely that KPMG would face criminal charges, but earned significantly positive abnormal returns following news reports of an impending settlement. Further, these abnormal returns appear to be driven by KPMG client firms in greater financial distress or subject to greater litigation risk. These findings are consistent with the insurance hypothesis. Although we cannot completely eliminate other explanations such as an assurance effect or switching costs, we argue that such explanations are unlikely to drive our main findings.


2012 ◽  
Vol 53 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 290-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Kim ◽  
Douglas J. Skinner

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uday Chandra

SYNOPSIS I investigate the extent and nature of income conservatism in the financial statement numbers of firms in the U.S. technology sector. Technology firms are predicted to have greater income conservatism than other U.S. firms because they are subject to both higher shareholder litigation risk and conservative accounting standards such as SFAS 2. In the absence of a generally accepted measure of conservatism, I examine several proxies, including loss incidence and accounting rates of return, operating cash flow and nonoperating accrual levels, and regression coefficients from the earnings-return model in Basu (1997). Relative to other companies, technology firms' earnings are characterized by higher (and intertemporally increasing) levels of both conditional and unconditional conservatism. These differences are both statistically and economically significant. Further analysis suggests that technology firms' higher conservatism results primarily from lower operating cash flows due to R&D expensing and more income-decreasing accounting accruals linked to litigation risk. The results of this study are potentially useful to financial analysts, researchers, regulators, managers, and other users of financial statements. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman

SUMMARY In this paper, we examine the relation between auditor litigation risk and abnormal accruals over the 1989–2007 time period. We address potential endogeneity in prior studies by jointly modeling abnormal accruals and litigation risk in a simultaneous equation system. Our findings suggest that client-specific litigation risk affects auditor incentives to acquiesce to client demands for earnings management, i.e., the higher the risk of auditor litigation, the greater the auditor's restraining influence on the abnormal accruals reported by the client. We also find evidence that abnormal accruals increase the likelihood of auditor litigation. We also document that the 1995 Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) lowered the client-specific risk of auditor litigation. Litigation reform remains a topic of ongoing interest. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the effects of litigation reform (and related changes in legal exposure) on auditor incentives and earnings management.


2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 577-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip P. M. Joos ◽  
Edith Leung

ABSTRACT This paper examines the stock market reaction to 15 events relating to IFRS adoption in the United States. The goal is to assess whether investors perceive the switch to IFRS as beneficial or costly. Our findings suggest that investors' reaction to IFRS adoption is more positive in cases where IFRS is expected to lead to convergence benefits. Our results also indicate a less positive market reaction for firms with higher litigation risk, which is consistent with investors' concerns about greater discretion and less implementation guidance under IFRS for these firms. Overall, the findings are relevant to the current debate on IFRS adoption in the U.S. and highlight the importance of convergence to investors. Data Availability:  All data are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper (see Appendices A and B).


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