Measuring Securities Litigation Risk

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Y. Kim ◽  
Douglas J. Skinner
Keyword(s):  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Securities Litigation

scholarly journals The Effects of Securities Class Action Litigation on Corporate Liquidity and Investment Policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 251-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Arena ◽  
Brandon Julio
Keyword(s):  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Corporate Investment ◽  
Class Action ◽  
Investment Policy ◽  
Capital Expenditures ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Corporate Liquidity ◽  
Temporal Effects

AbstractThe risk of securities class action litigation alters corporate savings and investment policy. Firms with greater exposure to securities litigation hold significantly more cash in anticipation of future settlements and other related costs. The result is due to firms accumulating cash in anticipation of lawsuits and not a consequence of plaintiffs targeting firms with high cash levels. The market value of cash is lower for firms exposed to litigation risk. Corporate investment decisions are also affected by litigation risk, as firms reduce capital expenditures in response. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and possible spurious temporal effects.

Measuring securities litigation risk

2012 ◽  
Vol 53 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 290-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Kim ◽  
Douglas J. Skinner
Keyword(s):  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Securities Litigation

Litigation Risk and Abnormal Accruals

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Equation System ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Simultaneous Equation System ◽  
Specific Risk ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Auditor Litigation

SUMMARY In this paper, we examine the relation between auditor litigation risk and abnormal accruals over the 1989–2007 time period. We address potential endogeneity in prior studies by jointly modeling abnormal accruals and litigation risk in a simultaneous equation system. Our findings suggest that client-specific litigation risk affects auditor incentives to acquiesce to client demands for earnings management, i.e., the higher the risk of auditor litigation, the greater the auditor's restraining influence on the abnormal accruals reported by the client. We also find evidence that abnormal accruals increase the likelihood of auditor litigation. We also document that the 1995 Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) lowered the client-specific risk of auditor litigation. Litigation reform remains a topic of ongoing interest. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the effects of litigation reform (and related changes in legal exposure) on auditor incentives and earnings management.

Securities litigation risk and board gender diversity

2021 ◽  
pp. 102102
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hashemi Joo ◽  
Edward Lawrence ◽  
Ali Parhizgari
Keyword(s):  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Board Gender Diversity

scholarly journals The unintended benefit of the risk factor mandate of 2005

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen H. Huang ◽  
Jianghua Shen ◽  
Amy Y. Zang
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Risk Factor ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Information Environment ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Unintended Effect ◽  
Least Squares Approach

AbstractIn 2005, the SEC mandated that firms disclose risk factors to provide useful information about firm risk. An unintended effect of the mandate is that mandatory risk factor (RF) disclosure may constitute “meaningful cautionary language” as defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, and may therefore provide legal protection for forward-looking statements (FLSs). Using both a difference-in-differences design and a two-stage least squares approach, we find that, following the mandate, firms that had not previously disclosed risk factors (late RF disclosers) became more willing to provide qualitative FLSs, particularly positive ones, than other firms. This finding is consistent with our prediction that, for late RF disclosers, the mandate reduces managers’ perceived litigation risk. We also find that these firms experience improvement in their information environment. A path analysis reveals that the mandate improves firms’ information environment not only directly but also indirectly by prompting more disclosure of positive FLSs, illustrating an unintended benefit of the 2005 RF mandate. Cross-sectional tests show that the RF mandate induces a larger increase in positive FLSs for firms whose managers perceive a higher level of benefit from safe harbor protection arising from meaningful cautionary statements.

Securities Price Consequences of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Related Events

2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashiq Ali ◽  
Sanjay Kallapur
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Securities Fraud ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns ◽  
Price Reversal ◽  
Private Litigation ◽  
Daily Returns

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) increases restrictions on private litigation for securities fraud. We examine stock price reactions on legislative-event-related days of firms in four high-litigation-risk industries. Two other studies on this issue, Spiess and Tkac (1997) (ST) and Johnson et al. (2000) (JKN), conclude that shareholders considered PSLRA beneficial. While we find largely similar daily abnormal returns for event-related days that they examine, we present evidence that the timing of multiple confounding events makes the interpretation of these daily returns ambiguous. Results from additional analyses beyond those conducted by ST and JKN (market price reversal tests, analysis of additional legislative-event-related days, cumulative abnormal returns over the legislative period, and analysis of other events affecting investors' ability to bring securities-related lawsuits), are largely inconsistent with their interpretation, suggesting instead that shareholders in the four high-litigation-risk industries react negatively on average to PSLRA's restrictions on their ability to bring securities-related lawsuits.

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