scholarly journals Importing Corruption Culture from Overseas: Evidence from Corporate Tax Evasion in the United States

Author(s):  
Jason Matthew DeBacker ◽  
Bradley T. Heim ◽  
Anh Tran
Author(s):  
P. Maggs

The regulation of convertible virtual currencies (for instance Bitcoin) is an area both of global cooperation and global competition. On the one hand, virtual currencies create serious problems of payment for illegal transactions, money laundering, tax evasion, and consumer fraud. On the other hand such currencies, have the potential to lower the costs of commercial and consumer transactions and to facilitate international trade. Both dealing with the problems and realizing the potential of virtual currencies require international cooperation.There is no uniformity in national legislation on virtual currency. A recent survey of over 100 countries showed a wide variation in both the amount and methods of regulation 2 . While, at this stage, experimentation with various types of regulation may help discover better ways to deal with this currency, on the other hand, there is a real danger that some countries will be come unregulated virtual currency havens where the worst aspects of virtual currency can flourish.This article will look at United States law, and also at existing and needed international cooperation in the areas of taxation, investor protection, consumer protection, monetary regulation, and crime prevention.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1137-1144
Author(s):  
Joel Barker

Estimates of over 20 billion of tax revenue are lost to our economy because of corporate inversions. Therefore, lawmakers are actively exploring ways to stop the hemorrhaging of corporate tax-revenues, tighten restrictions on corporate inversions, and to find ways to collect on defer tax revenues. From a business prospective, corporate inversions are nothing less than prudent, innovative, business strategies to enhance corporate profits. However, it’s undoubtedly having a significant impact on U.S. tax revenues and ultimately reducing domestic investments. Ireland is now the most popular new home to many U.S. Corporations, especially within the pharmaceutical industry. The advantageous tax incentives offered by Ireland is a “no-brainer,” when compared to the heavy taxes levied upon domestic business. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there has been no major tax reform to the United States Tax System. Despite the various proposals and recommendations made to address this growing economic issue, all concern parties are in consensus that the United States Tax System needs reform.


Author(s):  
Sven H. Steinmo

Why are some people more willing to pay their taxes than others? In some countries the government is able to collect more than 90% of the taxes it is owed, while in other countries more than 30% of tax revenue goes missing due to tax evasion. This book explores this question by examining the fiscal history of five different democratic nations: Sweden, Britain, Italy, the United States, and Romania. This chapter introduces the book and draws out the central themes introduced in the substantive chapters. Drawing on these rich historical chapters, the introduction shows that successful states have developed strong administrative capacities, treat all taxpayers fairly, and deliver value for the monies they collect. This chapter argues that differences in tax compliance across countries is not explained by different political cultures, but is instead explained by differences in the efficacy of state institutions and the ways they have interacted with their citizens.


Author(s):  
Lukas Hakelberg

This chapter takes a look at the ability of a great power like the United States to unilaterally effect fundamental change in international tax policy through coercion. It first shows that the structural constraints precluding a common interest in countermeasures to tax evasion were still in place when the US Congress passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Second, the chapter reveals that there was no need for normative change, because regulative norms have never consistently prevented the United States from interfering with the legal systems of tax havens. From there, the chapter considers when a great power like the United States can effect fundamental change in international tax policy and the domestic tax policies of less powerful countries through coercion. It argues that a government reaches great power status if it controls an internal market large enough to reduce its dependence on international trade and investment relative to the government's negotiating partners and uses its regulatory capacity to effectively restrict market access for foreign firms or investors.


2007 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. McGee ◽  
Simon S. M. Ho ◽  
Annie Y. S. Li

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