Consumption Schedules and the Serial Rule: On the Full Preference Domain

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eun Jeong Heo
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 338-373
Author(s):  
Tommy Andersson ◽  
Ágnes Cseh ◽  
Lars Ehlers ◽  
Albin Erlanson

This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable, agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs. (JEL C78, D47, D82)


Phonology ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-479
Author(s):  
Külli Prillop

This article introduces basic principles of a generative theory of phonology that unifies aspects of parallel constraint-based theories and serial rule-based theories. In the core of the grammar are phonological processes that consist of a markedness constraint and a repair. Processes are universal, but every language activates a different set, and applies them in different orders. Phonological processes may be in bleeding or feeding relations. These two basic relations are sufficient to define more complicated interactions, such as blocking, derived and non-derived environment effects, chain shifts and allophony.


2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 1091-1133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommy Andersson ◽  
Jörgen Kratz

Abstract Advances in medical technology have made kidney transplants over the blood group barrier feasible. This article investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group incompatible donor motivates an extension of the preference domain, allowing patients to distinguish between compatible donors and half-compatible donors (i.e. blood group incompatible donors that only become compatible after undergoing an immunosuppressive treatment). It is demonstrated that the number of transplants can be substantially increased by providing an incentive for patients with half-compatible donors to participate in kidney exchange programs. The results also suggest that the technology is beneficial for patient groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in kidney exchange programs (e.g. blood group O patients). The positive effect of allowing transplants over the blood group barrier is larger than the corresponding effects of including altruistic patient–donor pairs or of allowing three-way exchanges in addition to pairwise exchanges.


2015 ◽  
Vol 229 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Arin ◽  
V. Feltkamp ◽  
M. Montero

2015 ◽  
Vol 158 ◽  
pp. 308-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Bogomolnaia

Utilitas ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 316-323
Author(s):  
MAURO ROSSI

The standard view holds that the degree to which an individual's preferences are satisfied is simply the degree to which the individual prefers the prospect that is realized to the other prospects in her preference domain. In this article, I reject the standard view by showing that it violates one fundamental intuition about degrees of preference satisfaction.


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