Family Firms and Auditor Choice: A Focus on IPO Firms

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun Keung (Stan) Hoi ◽  
Ashok Robin ◽  
Mithu Dey
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2297-2329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin N. Srinidhi ◽  
Shaohua He ◽  
Michael Firth

ABSTRACT Family firms are characterized by less separation between ownership and control (Type 1 agency problem), but greater conflict of interest between controlling insiders and non-controlling outside investors (Type 2 agency problem). Although strong board governance is known to decrease the Type 1 agency problem, its effectiveness in mitigating the adverse consequences of the Type 2 agency problem has not been well documented in the literature. We show that strongly governed family firms are more likely to choose specialist auditors and exhibit higher earnings quality than nonfamily firms. Weakly governed family firms demand lower audit effort and exhibit earnings quality that is no different from that of nonfamily firms. Within family firms, we show that strongly governed family firms choose higher quality audits in the form of a greater use of specialist auditors and higher audit efforts, and exhibit higher earnings quality than other family firms. These findings provide consistent evidence that strong board governance can effectively mitigate the adverse consequences of the Type 2 agency problem on financial reporting and transparency in family firms. Data Availability: The data used are available from the public sources identified in the study.


2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 71-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna L. Ho ◽  
Fei Kang

SUMMARY We examine auditor choice and audit fees in family firms using data from Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms. We find that, compared to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to hire top-tier auditors due to the less severe agency problems between owners and managers. Our results also show that family firms, on average, incur lower audit fees than non-family firms, which is driven by family firms' lower demand for external auditing services and auditors' perceived lower audit risk for family firms. Our additional analysis indicates that the tendency of family firms to hire non-top-tier auditors and to pay lower audit fees is stronger when family owners actively monitor their firms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-96
Author(s):  
Senny Harindahyani ◽  
Celine Widjaja

Family firms in Indonesia have an important role in the Indonesian economy. However, agency problems might happen inside family firms where it will lead to conflict of interest and information asymmetry, along with the entrenchment effect where it leads firms to produce lower quality earnings report. Research from 305 firms in Indonesia shows that the agency problems and the entrenchment effect has not affected the family firms in Indonesia, reflected from the firm‟s decision making in their amount of audit fee and auditor choice. This study will contribute by providing an empirical evidence of the effect of family control on the audit fee and auditor choice in a developing country. The result shows that the type of firms has no correlation on the amount of audit fee paid to the auditor and both firms‟ demands the same level of audit quality where it is shown by their choices of audit firms, which is Big 4 audit firm or Non-Big 4 audit firm. In conclusion, the level of agency problems and entrenchment effect tends to be lower in the family firms of Indonesia.


Author(s):  
Adrian C.H. Lei ◽  
Samuel W. K. Lam

Purpose –The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of family control/ownership on auditor choice and audit fees in Hong Kong. Besides, this paper also addresses the impact of multiple directorship of audit committee members on these two external auditing dimensions.Design/methodology/approach –Panel data technique is used to perform analysis. The unbalanced panel data set consists of 2,724 firm-year observations for nine years from year 2001 to 2009.Findings –The results indicate that family firms have a higher likelihood to appoint Big 5 auditors, it supports the signaling hypothesis. Contrasting the perceived higher audit risk, they incur lower audit fees. The results also show the independent audit committee members with multiple directorships are not affected by their busyness. Our results are also robust to the alternative definition of family firms and by using the sub-sample within 2004 - 2009. We also find that the firms controlled by recognized Big family in Hong Kong society incur higher audit fees but no support for family firm incurring higher non audit fee.Originality/value–First, our paper responds to the recent call for research for auditor choice and audit fees within the context of emerging economies. Secondly, this paper also explores other determinants of auditor choice and audit fees in HK such as the characteristics of the audit committee and multiple directorships. Thirdly, our findings contribute to the family firms’ literature by shedding light on family firms do enhance their external auditing function to improve the credibility of financial reporting of the firms which is expected to help investors and public in HK to know more about the effect of family control on the external auditing to protect their interest. The findings in this paper are also valuable to regulators who might concern the corporate governance and informativeness in family firms. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 089448652110578
Author(s):  
Jengfang Chen ◽  
Ni-Yun Chen ◽  
Liyu He ◽  
Chris Patel

Despite the substantial degree of heterogeneity within family firms, little is known about how their heterogeneity affects firm behavior and the implication for the shareholder–debtholder agency problem. Our study contributes to the literature by examining whether family firms with a higher level of control-ownership divergence would disclose less information and whether Big 4 auditors play a moderating role in mitigating the negative impact of control-ownership divergence on disclosure quality resulting in improved credit ratings. Using data from the emerging economy of Taiwan, we provide support for our three hypotheses. Our contributions will interest family firm owners, researchers, auditors, and policymakers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-86
Author(s):  
Hae-Young Ryu ◽  
Soo-Joon Chae
Keyword(s):  

IESE Insight ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Danny Miller ◽  
Isabelle Le Breton-Miller
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Ron Harris

Before the seventeenth century, trade across Eurasia was mostly conducted in short segments along the Silk Route and Indian Ocean. Business was organized in family firms, merchant networks, and state-owned enterprises, and dominated by Chinese, Indian, and Arabic traders. However, around 1600 the first two joint-stock corporations, the English and Dutch East India Companies, were established. This book tells the story of overland and maritime trade without Europeans, of European Cape Route trade without corporations, and of how new, large-scale, and impersonal organizations arose in Europe to control long-distance trade for more than three centuries. It shows that by 1700, the scene and methods for global trade had dramatically changed: Dutch and English merchants shepherded goods directly from China and India to northwestern Europe. To understand this transformation, the book compares the organizational forms used in four major regions: China, India, the Middle East, and Western Europe. The English and Dutch were the last to leap into Eurasian trade, and they innovated in order to compete. They raised capital from passive investors through impersonal stock markets and their joint-stock corporations deployed more capital, ships, and agents to deliver goods from their origins to consumers. The book explores the history behind a cornerstone of the modern economy, and how this organizational revolution contributed to the formation of global trade and the creation of the business corporation as a key factor in Europe's economic rise.


Think India ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-19
Author(s):  
Ang Bao

The objective of this paper is to find the relationship between family firms’ CSR engagement and their non-family member employees’ organisational identification. Drawing upon the existing literature on social identity theory, corporate social responsibility and family firms, the author proposes that family firms engage actively in CSR programs in a balanced manner to increase non-family member employees’ organisational identification. The findings of the research suggest that by developing and implementing balanced CSR programs, and actively getting engaged in CSR activities, family firms may help their non-family member employees better identify themselves with the firms. The article points out that due to unbalanced CSR resource allocation, family firms face the problem of inefficient CSR program implementation, and are suggested to switch alternatively to an improved scheme. Family firms may be advised to take corresponding steps to select right employees, communicate better with non-family member employees, use resources better and handle firms’ succession problems efficiently. The paper extends employees’ identification and CSR research into the family firm research domain and points out some drawbacks in family firms’ CSR resource allocation while formerly were seldom noticed.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document