Procedural Justice in International Negotiations on Climate Change

Author(s):  
Marco Grasso ◽  
Simona Sacchi
2001 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Ward ◽  
Frank Grundig ◽  
Ethan R. Zorick

We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto-players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong bargaining position.


2020 ◽  
pp. 107808741991082
Author(s):  
Linda Shi

Planners and activists are identifying ways to promote equitable adaptation that counter climate injustice. This article explores how this progressive turn in adaptation compares with past progressive movements. I argue urban progressive politics have cyclical tendencies toward liberalism and radicalism, and that the evolution of planning for climate adaptation mirrors these waves. I review 10 recent guidance documents that recommend strategies for enhancing racially just adaptation. I then assess how these recommendations advance the three pillars of progressive reforms: redistribution, expansion of democracy, and structural reform. I find that proposed strategies for racially just resilience are a welcome advance from mainstream, unjust resilience planning. However, history suggests that the focus on procedural justice for oppressed communities seen in recent discourse may limit their scope and durability. I conclude with suggestions for areas where climate activists and scholars can expand given emerging political space for ambitious thinking under a Green New Deal.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura A. Henry ◽  
Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom

On November 5, 2004, the Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, effectively saving the treaty. Battling domestic interests, in which a majority of pro-Kyoto voices were countered by a small but powerful minority of Kyoto opponents, had little influence on the decision due to the centralized institutional environment in Russia which allows the President great autonomy in foreign policy. President Putin ratified the treaty because Russia would likely gain leverage in other international negotiations and contribute to an image of itself as a good member of the club of advanced industrialized states. He delayed ratification to clarify evidence about gains versus losses from Kyoto provisions and to secure concessions from other Kyoto ratifiers in other international negotiations. Existing implementation efforts are slow but indicate that Russia's strategy will emphasize maximizing profits through treaty mechanisms over maximizing emissions reductions.


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