Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far, Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda

Author(s):  
Jennifer L. Sheppard
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis deRosset
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-166
Author(s):  
Maria Cherba ◽  
Frédéric Tremblay

Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8 (106)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Natalia Zaitseva

The paper examines the relationship between logic and cognitive science. We consider various aspects of this relationship, among which we distinguish three of the most importance, in our thought. First, it is the role of cognitive science in the justification of logic. Secondly, the mutual influence of cognitive science and modern trends of non-classical logic, which have a clearly applied character. Third, we discuss the prospects of the so-called experimental logic arising from attempts to apply the methods of cognitive science in logic. As usual, the conclusion summarizes the results of the research and focuses on the issue of the status of pure logic.


1864 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-450
Author(s):  
Kelland

The subject of this paper is a very old one, and may to many appear to be sufficiently worn; but I venture to hope, that there are some to whom a glimpse of the successive approaches of the human mind towards the right understanding of a question of pure logic, may have an interest,—even although the problem solved be an abstract one, and the conclusion a negative conclusion, having little practical application. Like the kindred problem of the quadrature of the circle, or the metaphysical problem of “Knowing and Being,” the theory of parallels has been attacked in various directions, and although it is true that no one ever reached the goal he aimed at, yet it is not the less certain that great and positive results have followed in the history of human attainment. If no other lesson has been learnt, this at least may have been: that in reasoning it is necessary to look warily around and abroad at every step, seeing that admissions, the most obviously inadmissible, or evasions the most palpable, have foiled generations of thinkers, whilst those who have detected their errors have fallen into others of an equally destructive character.


2021 ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
Svetlana Berdaus

The article proposes a reconstruction of the Kunstlehre concept, which occupies an important place in the structural and disciplinary section of Husserl's phenomenology. The key point of the presented reconstruction is its separation from the traditional interpretation of Kunstlehre criticized by Husserl and the advancement of a new project that coordinates three levels – theoretical, normative and practical. The theoretical level (pure logic), being complementary to the normative level (pure norms of reason), forms the basis of the disciplines represented by the program of science of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). The scientific study program falls on the period of the so- called logicism of Husserl, regarding which there is an opinion in the research literature that it was interrupted by the founder of phenomenology immediately after the writing of the first volume of “Logical Investigations”. However, on the basis of textual arguments, we show that this program was extended by Husserl up to his last works. The nature of this expansion is related to the practical level of Kunstlehre (transcendental phenomenology). The main task of this level was to provide science and scientists with noetic conditions, i.e. skills of transcendental criticism of consciousness. It is suggested that the presented reconstruction of Kunstlehre shows the permanent development of the program of logicism by Husserl, and also demonstrates the connection of this program with transcendental phenomenology.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-124
Author(s):  
Sasa Popovic

The notion of grounding is one of the central notions in the debates concerning ontological dependence in contemporary metaphysics and metametaphysics. In this paper we have carried out a comparative analysis of grounding, supervenience, reality, fundamentality, and cognate notions, and we have demonstrated what their role should be in the context of neo-Aristotelian hierarchical ontologies and the project of metaphysical foundationalism. We have also sketched out some basic outlines of what Kit Fine calls ?the pure logic of ground? by establishing certain formal desiderata which grounding ought to meet in order to successfully carry out its specific ontologico- explanatory role. It is finally shown that grounding suffers from similar problems and shortcomings as supervenience, and that a satisfactory solution of those problems cannot be found by looking to metaphysical primitivism according to which grounding is a sui generis, primitive and unanalysable notion which is nonetheless essential for metaphysics. Even though grounding might turn out to be an ?essentially contested concept?, in the end we suggest how the aforementioned problems might be met by means of holistic considerations of grounding within the broader context of the entire (meta)metaphysical theory.


2021 ◽  
pp. 268-311
Author(s):  
Paolo Mancosu ◽  
Sergio Galvan ◽  
Richard Zach

This chapter opens the part of the book that deals with ordinal proof theory. Here the systems of interest are not purely logical ones, but rather formalized versions of mathematical theories, and in particular the first-order version of classical arithmetic built on top of the sequent calculus. Classical arithmetic goes beyond pure logic in that it contains a number of specific axioms for, among other symbols, 0 and the successor function. In particular, it contains the rule of induction, which is the essential rule characterizing the natural numbers. Proving a cut-elimination theorem for this system is hopeless, but something analogous to the cut-elimination theorem can be obtained. Indeed, one can show that every proof of a sequent containing only atomic formulas can be transformed into a proof that only applies the cut rule to atomic formulas. Such proofs, which do not make use of the induction rule and which only concern sequents consisting of atomic formulas, are called simple. It is shown that simple proofs cannot be proofs of the empty sequent, i.e., of a contradiction. The process of transforming the original proof into a simple proof is quite involved and requires the successive elimination, among other things, of “complex” cuts and applications of the rules of induction. The chapter describes in some detail how this transformation works, working through a number of illustrative examples. However, the transformation on its own does not guarantee that the process will eventually terminate in a simple proof.


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