Better Semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground

2015 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis deRosset
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-124
Author(s):  
Sasa Popovic

The notion of grounding is one of the central notions in the debates concerning ontological dependence in contemporary metaphysics and metametaphysics. In this paper we have carried out a comparative analysis of grounding, supervenience, reality, fundamentality, and cognate notions, and we have demonstrated what their role should be in the context of neo-Aristotelian hierarchical ontologies and the project of metaphysical foundationalism. We have also sketched out some basic outlines of what Kit Fine calls ?the pure logic of ground? by establishing certain formal desiderata which grounding ought to meet in order to successfully carry out its specific ontologico- explanatory role. It is finally shown that grounding suffers from similar problems and shortcomings as supervenience, and that a satisfactory solution of those problems cannot be found by looking to metaphysical primitivism according to which grounding is a sui generis, primitive and unanalysable notion which is nonetheless essential for metaphysics. Even though grounding might turn out to be an ?essentially contested concept?, in the end we suggest how the aforementioned problems might be met by means of holistic considerations of grounding within the broader context of the entire (meta)metaphysical theory.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIT FINE

AbstractI lay down a system of structural rules for various notions of ground and establish soundness and completeness.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-435
Author(s):  
JON ERLING LITLAND

AbstractThis article develops the Pure Logic of Iterated Full Ground (plifg), a logic of ground that can deal with claims of the form “ϕ grounds that (ψ grounds θ)”—what we call iterated grounding claims. The core idea is that some truths Γ ground a truth ϕ when there is an explanatory argument (of a certain sort) from premisses Γ to conclusion ϕ. By developing a deductive system that distinguishes between explanatory and nonexplanatory arguments we can give introduction rules for operators for factive and nonfactive full ground, as well as for a propositional “identity” connective. Elimination rules are then found by using a proof-theoretic inversion principle.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
LOUIS DEROSSET

AbstractThough the study of grounding is still in the early stages, Kit Fine, in ”The Pure Logic of Ground”, has made a seminal attempt at formalization. Formalization of this sort is supposed to bring clarity and precision to our theorizing, as it has to the study of other metaphysically important phenomena, like modality and vagueness. Unfortunately, as I will argue, Fine ties the formal treatment of grounding to the obscure notion of a weak ground. The obscurity of weak ground, together with its centrality in Fine’s system, threatens to undermine the extent to which this formalization offers clarity and precision. In this paper, I show how to overcome this problem. I describe a system, the logic of strict ground (LSG) and demonstrate its adequacy; I specify a translation scheme for interpreting Fine’s weak grounding claims; I show that the interpretation verifies all of the principles of Fine’s system; and I show that derivability in Fine’s system can be exactly characterized in terms of derivability in LSG. I conclude that Fine’s system is reducible to LSG.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-166
Author(s):  
Maria Cherba ◽  
Frédéric Tremblay

Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8 (106)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Natalia Zaitseva

The paper examines the relationship between logic and cognitive science. We consider various aspects of this relationship, among which we distinguish three of the most importance, in our thought. First, it is the role of cognitive science in the justification of logic. Secondly, the mutual influence of cognitive science and modern trends of non-classical logic, which have a clearly applied character. Third, we discuss the prospects of the so-called experimental logic arising from attempts to apply the methods of cognitive science in logic. As usual, the conclusion summarizes the results of the research and focuses on the issue of the status of pure logic.


1864 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-450
Author(s):  
Kelland

The subject of this paper is a very old one, and may to many appear to be sufficiently worn; but I venture to hope, that there are some to whom a glimpse of the successive approaches of the human mind towards the right understanding of a question of pure logic, may have an interest,—even although the problem solved be an abstract one, and the conclusion a negative conclusion, having little practical application. Like the kindred problem of the quadrature of the circle, or the metaphysical problem of “Knowing and Being,” the theory of parallels has been attacked in various directions, and although it is true that no one ever reached the goal he aimed at, yet it is not the less certain that great and positive results have followed in the history of human attainment. If no other lesson has been learnt, this at least may have been: that in reasoning it is necessary to look warily around and abroad at every step, seeing that admissions, the most obviously inadmissible, or evasions the most palpable, have foiled generations of thinkers, whilst those who have detected their errors have fallen into others of an equally destructive character.


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