Can Ex Post Merger Control Enhance the Efficiency of Competition Policy?

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrice Bougette ◽  
Florent Venayre
2020 ◽  
Vol 28 ((S1)) ◽  
pp. 373-394
Author(s):  
Nasarudin Abdul Rahman ◽  
Mushera Ambaras Khan ◽  
Ida Madieha Abdul Ghani Azmi ◽  
Mohd Radhuan Arif Zakaria

Uber-Grab’s merger had attracted antitrust scrutiny by competition authorities in Southeast-Asia. The merger between the two had created a large giant company that provides various services through a platform such as ridesharing and food delivery services. According to the deal, Grab will take over Uber’s assets (ridesharing and food delivery service), and in return, Uber will take a 27.5 percent stake in Grab. Although Grab claimed that the merger would create a cost-efficient platform in Southeast Asia and put it in a better position to serve consumers, there was a genuine concern that the merger will reduce competition in the market and provide incentives to Grab to engage in anti-competitive behaviour such as increasing the price of its services. This article aims to analyse how different countries in Southeast Asia responded to the Uber-Grab’s merger and measures taken to address competitive concerns ex-ante and ex-post-merger. Unlike other competition jurisdictions in Southeast-Asia, the Malaysia Competition Act 2010 contains no merger control provision, which empowers the Malaysian competition authority to block any merger that has the effect of substantially lessening competition. The studies on how other countries evaluated the Uber-Grab merger could assist Malaysia’s competition authority to regulate the future behaviour of the big digital platform in the Malaysian market. This article was written based on research that relies on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include statutory provisions on competition, decision, proposed decision, interim measures, and others. while secondary sources include journal articles, news, internet resources, and others. The article also adopts a comparative approach in order to analyse the approaches and measures taken by the various merger control regimes in Southeast Asia in dealing with the Uber-Grab’s merger.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.


2004 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Mikek ◽  
Monika Šlebinger ◽  
Franjo Mlinaric

The article reviews and assesses the institutional (legal) and economic framework for merger control and competition policy in Slovenia. We investigate the functioning of the Slovenian Competition Protection Office. We also discuss possible reasons for the small number of denied mergers, with accession to the EU and the openness of the economy being the most important. Further, we use three case studies to illustrate that the unfinished transition process allows a possibility for political interference in merging activities.


De Economist ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 156 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Buccirossi ◽  
Lorenzo Ciari ◽  
Tomaso Duso ◽  
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson ◽  
Giancarlo Spagnolo ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Rafael Moner-Colonques ◽  
Jose J. Sempere-Monerris

This chapter aims to contribute to the better understanding of R&D by scholars and practitioners. It includes a first section where the concept of innovation is defined and its public good nature and cumulative dimension are analysed. Next, the incentives that firms have to undertake R&D to attain a competitive edge upon rivals are considered. This entails the consideration of both ex ante and ex post incentives to undertake R&D. Since innovation is costly and derives important external effects, cooperation in R&D activities is prominent in several industries where firms enter into research joint ventures, or form research networks. The effect of cooperation is that, under some circumstances, the industry performance is better as compared to full competition. The final section addresses the complementarities and conflicts among the different microeconomic policies (trade, industrial and competition policy) faced by governments when considering the support of R&D activities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-145
Author(s):  
Andrew Mell ◽  
Gareth Shier

Around the world, competition agencies and academics alike have raised concerns that the existing suite of policy tools and economic theory fail to capture all of the harms that can arise in digital markets. At the same time, other academics and practitioners consider that competition policy and industrial organization is unable to account for many of the benefits that online platforms and digital ecosystems can bring. As a range of new interventions – ranging from strengthened ex-post enforcement tools to new ex-ante regulations – are being proposed, we ask which view is right? Are the business practices observed in digital markets and targeted by these reforms so obviously harmful that they are deserving of a return to form-based prohibitions in place of effects-based analysis? Or does this represent an unhelpful regression, based on a misunderstanding of how these new types of markets function?


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document