scholarly journals Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs: An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos G. Scartascini ◽  
Ernesto Hugo Stein ◽  
Mariano Tommasi
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Trade Offs

scholarly journals Economic freedom and veto players jointly affect entrepreneurship

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 340-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Lihn ◽  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Entrepreneurial Activity ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Correction Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Self Employment ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how the strength of political veto players affects the long-run credibility of economic institutions and how they jointly affect entrepreneurial activity. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ an annual panel covering 30 OECD countries from 1993 to 2011. Findings An error correction model identifies a positive and significant short-run effect on self-employment from large government spending at low levels of veto player strength. A static model conversely indicates that smaller government spending is positively associated with entrepreneurship at lower levels of veto player strength in the long run. Originality/value The authors are the first to explore the interaction of economic and political institutions in the development of entrepreneurship.

Austerity and U.S. Strategy

2019 ◽  
pp. 303-316
Author(s):  
Melvyn P. Leffler
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Domestic Economy ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Past ◽  
Means And Ends ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
The World ◽  
At Home

This chapter argues that austere times presented opportunities to reassess strategic concepts, think rigorously about goals, recalibrate priorities, and link means and ends. Constraints on defense spending forced policymakers to think more creatively about diplomatic solutions. This sometimes catalyzed bold initiatives to reassure friends and engage adversaries. In the past, budgetary austerity also forced officials to wrestle more forthrightly with the trade-offs between priorities at home and commitments abroad. It was an exercise that invariably reminded all Americans that the real sources of U.S. strength in the world were the health of its domestic economy, the vitality of its people, and the resilience of its political institutions.

scholarly journals Erratum: Trade-offs and Veto Players: Reforming Pensions in France and Italy

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Natali ◽  
Martin Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Veto Players ◽  
Trade Offs

The Millennium Development Goals and Education: Accountability and Substitution in Global Assessment

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (03) ◽  
pp. 547-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
James H. Bisbee ◽  
James R. Hollyer ◽  
B. Peter Rosendorff ◽  
James Raymond Vreeland
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Millennium Development Goals ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Substitution Effect ◽  
Substitution Effects ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Enrollment Rates ◽  
Development Goals

AbstractPrecise international metrics and assessments may induce governments to alter policies in pursuit of more favorable assessments according to these metrics. In this paper, we explore a secondary effect of global performance indicators (GPIs). Insofar as governments have finite resources and make trade-offs in public goods investments, a GPI that precisely targets the provision of a particular public good may cause governments to substitute away from the provision of other, related, public goods. We argue that both the main effect of the GPI (on the measured public good) and this substitution effect vary systematically based on the domestic political institutions and informational environments of targeted states. Specifically, we contend that both the main and substitution effects of GPIs should be largest for governments that are least accountable (opaque and nondemocratic) and should be smallest for those that are most accountable. We illustrate the logic of these arguments using a formal model and test these claims using data on primary and secondary enrollment rates across 114 countries. We find that countries substitute toward primary education enrollment rates (which is targeted by the Millennium Development Goals) and away from secondary (which is not), and that these effects are mitigated as accountability rises.

Political normativity and the functional autonomy of politics

2020 ◽  
pp. 147488512091850
Author(s):  
Carlo Burelli
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Political Function ◽  
Biology I ◽  
Functional Autonomy ◽  
New Interpretation

This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim that politics is autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article defends an original normative source: functional normativity. Second, it advocates a substantive functional standard: political institutions ought to be assessed by their capacity to select and implement collective decisions. Drawing from the ‘etiological account’ in philosophy of biology, I will argue that functions yield normative standards, which are independent from morality. For example, a ‘good heart’ is one that pumps blood well, and a good army is one that it is effective at exerting military force. I then interpret realism’s naturalistic conception of politics as an etiological function of social groups: namely making binding collective decisions under persistent disagreement. I conclude that political institutions should be evaluated realistically by how well they perform this task. Finally, I assess trade-offs between this functional political normativity and other moral values. I conclude that justice, fairness, freedom and equality remain obviously important concerns, but only once the basic political function is secured.

scholarly journals Health Care Cost-Containment Regulation: Prospects and an Alternative

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clark C. Havighurst
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Cost Containment ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Health Care Cost ◽  
Regulatory Decision ◽  
Cost Constraints ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
Health Related

AbstractRegulation of the health care system to achieve appropriate containment of overall costs is characterized by Professor Havighurst as requiring public officials to engage, directly or indirectly, in the rationing of medical services. This rationing function is seen by the author as peculiarly difficult for political institutions to perform, given the public's expectations and the symbolic importance of health care. An effort on the part of regulators to shift the rationing burden to providers is detected, as is a trend toward increasingly arbitrary regulation, designed to minimize regulators’ confrontations with sensitive issues. Irrationality and ignorance are found to plague regulatory decision making on health-related issues, even though it is the consumer who is usually thought to suffer most from these disabilities. The author argues that consumer choice under some cost constraints is a preferable mechanism for allocating resources because it better reflects individuals’ subjective preferences, has a greater capacity for facing trade-offs realistically, and can better contend with professional dominance of the resource allocation process.In view of the unlikelihood of regulation that is both sensitive and effective in containing costs, the author proposes that we rely primarily on consumer incentives to reform the system. A simple change in the tax treatment of health insurance or other health plan premiums, to strengthen consumers’ interest in cost containment while also subsidizing needy consumers, is advocated. Steps to improve opportunities for innovation in cost containment by health insurers, HMOs, and other actors are outlined briefly.

Political Institutions

2021 ◽  
pp. 312-328
Author(s):  
Ellen M. Immergut
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Consensus Democracy ◽  
Welfare State Development ◽  
Veto Points ◽  
The Impact

This chapter surveys theories and empirical evidence about the impact of state structures and political institutions on welfare state structures and outcomes. It shows that the political-institutional analysis of welfare states has shifted over time from an interest in static structures to a much more dynamic analysis of the interplay amongst preferences, structures, ideas, and institutions. It reviews different approaches to the study of political institutions, including majoritarian versus consensus democracy, veto points, and veto players. The impact of veto points on welfare state development and change, as well as the links between electoral systems and electoral dynamics on social policy outcomes, are explained and discussed. The chapter concludes with a review of the impact of past policies on welfare state politics and outcomes.

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