scholarly journals Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos G. Scartascini ◽  
Mariano Tommasi ◽  
Ernesto Hugo Stein
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Veto Players

scholarly journals Economic freedom and veto players jointly affect entrepreneurship

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 340-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Lihn ◽  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Entrepreneurial Activity ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Correction Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Self Employment ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how the strength of political veto players affects the long-run credibility of economic institutions and how they jointly affect entrepreneurial activity. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ an annual panel covering 30 OECD countries from 1993 to 2011. Findings An error correction model identifies a positive and significant short-run effect on self-employment from large government spending at low levels of veto player strength. A static model conversely indicates that smaller government spending is positively associated with entrepreneurship at lower levels of veto player strength in the long run. Originality/value The authors are the first to explore the interaction of economic and political institutions in the development of entrepreneurship.

Political Institutions

2021 ◽  
pp. 312-328
Author(s):  
Ellen M. Immergut
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Consensus Democracy ◽  
Welfare State Development ◽  
Veto Points ◽  
The Impact

This chapter surveys theories and empirical evidence about the impact of state structures and political institutions on welfare state structures and outcomes. It shows that the political-institutional analysis of welfare states has shifted over time from an interest in static structures to a much more dynamic analysis of the interplay amongst preferences, structures, ideas, and institutions. It reviews different approaches to the study of political institutions, including majoritarian versus consensus democracy, veto points, and veto players. The impact of veto points on welfare state development and change, as well as the links between electoral systems and electoral dynamics on social policy outcomes, are explained and discussed. The chapter concludes with a review of the impact of past policies on welfare state politics and outcomes.

Political Dilemmas and the Institutional Foundation of Economic Development

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mogens K. Justesen
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
National Differences ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Cross National

Differences in property rights institutions are often thought to contribute to explaining cross-national differences in economic development. If secure and universally enforced property rights help produce collectively beneficial economic results, the question is why there is so much variation in the institutions and rules that regulate property rights. Based on institutional analysis, the purpose of this article is to analyse why some states and governments establish and enforce property rights that are good for growth while others do not. The argument is that the incentive to enforce and protect property rights is shaped by particular political institutions, namely those that relate to the size of a government’s supporting coalition and the extent of power sharing among veto players. The empirical analyses show that coalition institutions are strongly related to property rights while the impact of power sharing is less robust.

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