Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Arya ◽  
Jonathan C. Glover ◽  
Uday Rajan
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Principal Agent

Principal-Agent Theory, Career Prospects, and U.S. Attorneys

2018 ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Banks Miller ◽  
Brett Curry
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
Career Ambition ◽  
Ambition Theory ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Service Employment

This chapter explores two theories central to understanding the behavior of federal prosecutors. First, principal-agent theory is introduced to frame the relationship between national political actors, or principals, in the executive and legislative branches and their agents—U.S. Attorneys (USAs). In that exploration, the chapter focuses on problems of adverse selection and the monitoring of agents by principals. Second, the chapter considers career ambition theory as it pertains to the post-service employment opportunities of USAs. That discussion focuses on the potential of USAs to ascend to higher positions in the administration or secure nomination to the federal bench, both of which require the approval of principals in the executive branch.

Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Husted
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

scholarly journals Peran Kelembagaan Perdesaan untuk Keberlanjutan Penerapan SRI di Kabupaten Karawang

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-127
Author(s):  
Luh Putu Suciati ◽  
Bambang Juanda ◽  
Akhmad Fauzi ◽  
Ernan Rustiadi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Farm Work ◽  
Logit Regression ◽  
Farmer Groups

AbstractSustainability of System of Rice Intensication (SRI) requires rural institution role. The study was conducted in Karawang and uses institutional economics approach and logit regression. The analysis shows potential problems of SRI related with principal-agent/institutional relation and economics transaction costs. Strengthening the activities within farmer groups will reduce economics transaction costs in beginning of application. Farmer will choose "bagi hasil/revenue sharing" as land management cooperation with moderate risks and transaction costs. Monitoring and incentive mechanism will reduce problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Some factors which determine the sustainability of SRI are production, principal position, off farm work and ex ante transaction costs.Keywords: Rural Institution, Transaction Cost Economics, System of Rice Intensication AbstrakKeberlanjutan penerapan metode System of Rice Intensication (SRI) membutuhkan peran kelembagaan perdesaan. Studi dilakukan di Kabupaten Karawang dan menggunakan pendekatan kelembagaan ekonomi dan regresi logit. Hasil analisis menunjukkan potensi problem metode SRI terkait hubungan kelembagaan principal-agent dan biaya transaksi ekonomi. Penguatan kinerja kelembagaan perdesaan melalui kegiatan bersama dalam kelompok tani mengurangi biaya transaksi ekonomi pada awal aplikasi SRI. Pilihan kerjasama pengelolaan lahan pola bagi hasil banyak dipilih terkait risiko dan biaya transaksi yang moderat. Potensi masalah berupa moral hazard dan adverse selection dapat dikurangi dengan pemantauan dan mekanisme insentif. Faktor determinan keberlanjutan penerapan metode SRI adalah peningkatan produksi padi, posisi sebagai pemilik lahan, pekerjaan di luar usaha tani, dan biaya transaksi sebelum pelaksanaan.Kata kunci: Kelembagaan Perdesaan, Biaya Transaksi Ekonomi, System of Rice Intensication

Implementation in Principal–Agent Models of Adverse Selection

2000 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Arya ◽  
Jonathan Glover ◽  
Uday Rajan
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Principal Agent
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