Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection

1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank H. Page Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Principal Agent

Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Husted
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

scholarly journals Peran Kelembagaan Perdesaan untuk Keberlanjutan Penerapan SRI di Kabupaten Karawang

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-127
Author(s):  
Luh Putu Suciati ◽  
Bambang Juanda ◽  
Akhmad Fauzi ◽  
Ernan Rustiadi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Farm Work ◽  
Logit Regression ◽  
Farmer Groups

AbstractSustainability of System of Rice Intensication (SRI) requires rural institution role. The study was conducted in Karawang and uses institutional economics approach and logit regression. The analysis shows potential problems of SRI related with principal-agent/institutional relation and economics transaction costs. Strengthening the activities within farmer groups will reduce economics transaction costs in beginning of application. Farmer will choose "bagi hasil/revenue sharing" as land management cooperation with moderate risks and transaction costs. Monitoring and incentive mechanism will reduce problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Some factors which determine the sustainability of SRI are production, principal position, off farm work and ex ante transaction costs.Keywords: Rural Institution, Transaction Cost Economics, System of Rice Intensication AbstrakKeberlanjutan penerapan metode System of Rice Intensication (SRI) membutuhkan peran kelembagaan perdesaan. Studi dilakukan di Kabupaten Karawang dan menggunakan pendekatan kelembagaan ekonomi dan regresi logit. Hasil analisis menunjukkan potensi problem metode SRI terkait hubungan kelembagaan principal-agent dan biaya transaksi ekonomi. Penguatan kinerja kelembagaan perdesaan melalui kegiatan bersama dalam kelompok tani mengurangi biaya transaksi ekonomi pada awal aplikasi SRI. Pilihan kerjasama pengelolaan lahan pola bagi hasil banyak dipilih terkait risiko dan biaya transaksi yang moderat. Potensi masalah berupa moral hazard dan adverse selection dapat dikurangi dengan pemantauan dan mekanisme insentif. Faktor determinan keberlanjutan penerapan metode SRI adalah peningkatan produksi padi, posisi sebagai pemilik lahan, pekerjaan di luar usaha tani, dan biaya transaksi sebelum pelaksanaan.Kata kunci: Kelembagaan Perdesaan, Biaya Transaksi Ekonomi, System of Rice Intensication

scholarly journals The Problem of Unilateralism in Agency Theory: Towards a Bilateral Formulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sareh Pouryousefi ◽  
Jeff Frooman
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Behaviour ◽  
Cautionary Tale ◽  
Economic Interactions ◽  
Normative Argument

ABSTRACT:Some business ethicists view agency theory as a cautionary tale—a proof that it is impossible to carry out successful economic interactions in the absence of ethical behaviour. The cautionary-tale view presents a nuanced normative characterisation of agency, but itsunilateralfocus betrays a limited understanding of the structure of social interaction. This article moves beyond unilateralism by presenting a descriptive and normative argument for abilateralcautionary-tale view. Specifically, we discuss hat swaps and role dualism in asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships and argue that the norm of reciprocity can function as a moral solution to agency risks in adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems. Our bilateral cautionary-tale formulation extends the normative boundaries of agency theory, while leaving the fundamental economic assumptions of agency theory intact.

scholarly journals A Student of Year 12 in Harrow International School Hong Kong

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 260
Author(s):  
Nanqi Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
International School ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
The Government

<p class="BodyA">George Akerlof introduced the idea that due to asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller in the lemons market, the market for second-hand vehicles will eventually go on the wane. Parallel to this argument, this essay discusses the extent of problem caused by information asymmetry in the financial market, with the most prominent issues being adverse selection, moral hazard and principal agent problem. Yet, with more regulation from the government and the market, some of these problems can be ameliorated, thus reducing the role that asymmetric information plays in the financial market.</p>

scholarly journals Research on Preventing Moral Hazard of Construction Project Based on Information Asymmetries

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 468-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pengcheng Xiang ◽  
Jinan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Optimization Model ◽  
Construction Project ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Information Asymmetries ◽  
Major Objective ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Theory

There exists the problem of information asymmetry among the participants in construction project who form economic partnerships one another. Information asymmetries among the participants in construction project places a premium on adverse selection and moral hazard. The major objective of this article is to implement the mechanisms of incentive and monitoring under the framework of principal-agent theory in analysis of moral hazard of construction project and to explore how to prevent it. The optimization model of incentive and monitoring under the circumstance of asymmetric information will be founded on the basis of the analysis of the effect of incentive and monitoring mechanisms in the principal- agent relationship. It indicates that reliability of information can be increased when bringing incentive and monitoring mechanisms into reward contract, which can prevent moral hazard of construction project.

scholarly journals The debtor-friendly fallacy in business rescue: Agency theory moderation and quasi relationships

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Pretorius
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Access ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Multiple Relationships ◽  
Regulatory Authorities

Tension often arises when Chapter 6 business rescue practitioners (BRPs) are appointed by directors to rescue their distressed businesses. Regulating by means of standard agency contracting becomes irrelevant in the resulting multiple relationships. Looking through the agency lens, using analytic autoethnography and compiling narratives, this paper explains the perceptions of what appear to be quasiagency relationships and obtains a better understanding of these. The findings suggest that the apparent principal-agent relationships suffer from asymmetries of goals, information access, informal power and diverging perceptions of moral hazard, transaction costs and adverse selection. As a solution, contracting has been shown to have limited value owing to outcome uncertainty and measurability. This is because the tasks of the BRP are non-programmable and term-dependent. The findings provide filing directors, shareholders, creditors, regulatory authorities and BRPs in this newly instituted regime, with enhanced understanding of how the relationships manifest in practice and overcome the non-contractibility of the newly formed relationships.

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