Characterization of a Second-Best Rationalizable Choice Function

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taposik Banerjee
Keyword(s):  
Choice Function ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Rationalizable Choice

scholarly journals Sequentially Rationalizable Choice

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1824-1839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Manzini ◽  
Marco Mariotti
Keyword(s):  
Choice Function ◽  
Binary Relations ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
Human Choice ◽  
Fixed Set ◽  
Rationalizable Choice

A sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function that can be retrieved by applying sequentially to each choice problem the same fixed set of asymmetric binary relations (rationales) to remove inferior alternatives. These concepts translate into economic language some human choice heuristics studied in psychology and explain cyclical patterns of choice observed in experiments. We study some properties of sequential rationalizability and provide a full characterization of choice functions rationalizable by two and three rationales. (JEL D01).

scholarly journals Strategyproof Choice of Social Acts

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 596-627
Author(s):  
Eric Bahel ◽  
Yves Sprumont
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Choice Function ◽  
Social Choice Function ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Social Acts ◽  
States Of Nature ◽  
Utility Preferences

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)

scholarly journals Pareto efficient income taxation without single-crossing

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-594
Author(s):  
Spencer Bastani ◽  
Sören Blomquist ◽  
Luca Micheletto
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Pareto Frontier ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
Work Related ◽  
Single Crossing ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Set Up

Abstract We provide a full characterization of a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where the single-crossing condition is violated due to an assumption that agents differ both in terms of market abilities and in terms of their needs for a work-related good. We set up a Pareto-efficient tax problem and analyze the entire second-best Pareto-frontier, highlighting several non-standard results, such as the possibility of income re-ranking relative to the laissez-faire and gaps in the Pareto-frontier.

The Remainder

2020 ◽  
pp. 63-84
Author(s):  
Ori J. Herstein
Keyword(s):  
Corrective Action ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Legal Remedies

This chapter suggests that we should question whether private law is genuinely about legal wrongs. It argues that the correction of wrongs ordinarily leaves a normative remainder. In morality, these remainders can provide, for example, reason for ongoing regret and remorse over one’s wrongdoing, and shows that corrective action taken subsequent to a wrong is, at most, a second-best way of responding to the reasons one has to comply with the violated moral duty. This chapter considers that the existence of a normative remainder is condition requisite to the characterization of faulty conduct as a wrong. It also claims that remainders must track the character of the wrong: moral wrongs leave moral remainders, and legal wrongs leave legal remainders. Thus, this chapter argues that whether private law is concerned with legal wrongs properly so-called depends on whether legal remedies leave a legal remainder. Doubting that such legal remainders obtain, the chapter raises a challenge to viewing private law as a law of legal wrongs.

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