scholarly journals The Political Economy of Rule of Law in Middle-Income Countries: A Comparison of Eastern Europe and China

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Peerenboom
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viroj Tangcharoensathien ◽  
Walaiporn Patcharanarumol ◽  
Anond Kulthanmanusorn ◽  
Nithiwat Saengruang ◽  
Hathairat Kosiyaporn

Author(s):  
John Kenneth Galbraith

This book examines what it calls the political economy of contentment. It argues that the fortunate and the favored do not contemplate and respond to their own longer-run well-being. Rather, they respond to immediate comfort and contentment. In the so-called capitalist countries, the controlling contentment and resulting belief is now that of the many, not just of the few. It operates under the guise of democracy, albeit a democracy not of all citizens but of those who, in defense of their social and economic advantage, actually go to the polls. This chapter discusses how economic life undergoes a constant process of change, and, in consequence, the same action or event occurring at different times can lead to very different results. It considers some examples throughout history, such as the economic ideas of the Physiocrats in France, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosolino A. Candela

AbstractHow did the evolution of the rule of law become stunted in Sicily during the 19th century? The work of economist Yoram Barzel, particularly his property-rights approach to understanding the political economy of state formation, is uniquely suited to understanding the failure of Italy's unification process to secure the rule of law in Sicily during the 19th century. This failure can be explained by a lack of a credible commitment to the rule of law in the state formation process. I argue that this lack of credible commitment manifested itself in the abolition of previously existing parliamentary institutions as an independent collective action mechanism, as well as prior constitutional agreements that existed in the Kingdom of Sicily. The resulting uncertainty over the security and legal definition of property rights over land raised the transaction costs of competing for resources through productive specialization and market exchange. In turn, it reduced the relative costs of competition for land ownership and the use of enforcement through other means, such as rent seeking or organized crime.


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