Ownership Structure, Economic Institutions, and Firm Burden: Evidence and Implications from China

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuanto Kusnadi ◽  
Zhifeng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Economic Institutions

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

Modeling the co-evolution of economic institutions and the economy of resource producing regions

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 122-131
Author(s):  
Vadim F. Islamutdinov ◽  
Sergey P. Semenov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Resource Availability ◽  
Regional Economy ◽  
Cumulative Effect ◽  
Volterra Equations ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Predator Prey Model ◽  
Resource Endowment ◽  
Disincentive Effect ◽  
Good Institution

The purpose of the study is to develop a model for the co-evolution of the regional economy and economic institutions. The research methods used: abstract-logical for the study of theoretical aspects and the experience of modeling co-evolution; and economic-mathematical for the development of own model of coevolution. The results of the study: approaches to modeling the evolution of economic institutions, as well as the co-evolution of the regional economy and economic institutions are considered, strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches to modeling co-evolution are identified, on the basis of the logistic model and Lotka-Volterra equations, an own co-evolution model has been developed, which includes three entities: regional economy, “good” institution and “bad” institution. Three versions of the model have been developed: the co-evolution of the regional economy and the “good” institution, the co-evolution of the regional economy and the “bad institution,” and a variant of the co-evolution of all three entities simultaneously, in which the “good” and “bad” institutions interact according to the “predator-prey” model, and their the cumulative effect determines the development of the regional economy. Numerical experiments have been carried out in the MathLab, which have shown the capabilities of the model to reflect the results of the co-evolution of the economy of a resource-producing region and economic institutions. In the first variant, a “good” institution promotes economic growth in excess of the level determined by resource availability. In the second variant, the “bad” institution has a disincentive effect on the GRP, as a result of which the GRP falls below the level determined by the resource endowment. In the third variant, the interaction of “good” and “bad” institutions still contributes to economic growth above the level determined by resource availability, but causes cyclical fluctuations in the GRP.

Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

CFA Digest ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Gregory G. Gocek
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs

Gentrification and functional change in Budapest – ‘ruin bars’ and the commodification of housing in a post-socialist context

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-26
Author(s):  
Gergely Olt ◽  
Adrienne Csizmady
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Hospitality Industry ◽  
Housing Stock ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Functional Change ◽  
Global Changes ◽  
Heritage Buildings ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Tourism And Hospitality Industry ◽  
Tourism And Hospitality

AbstractThe growth of the tourism and hospitality industry played an important role in the gentrification of the post-socialist city of Budapest. Although disinvestment was present, reinvestment was moderate for decades after 1989. Privatisation of individual tenancies and the consequent fragmented ownership structure of heritage buildings made refurbishment and reinvestment less profitable. Because of local contextual factors and global changes in consumption habits, the function of the dilapidated 19th century housing stock transformed in the 2000s, and the residential neighbourhood which was the subject of the research turned into the so called ‘party district’. The process was followed in our ongoing field research. The functional change made possible speculative investment in inner city housing and played a major role in the commodification of the disinvested housing stock.

Mahmood Hasan Khan. Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1981. pp.xviii+ 307.

1981 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas H. Perry
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Land Ownership ◽  
Past Century ◽  
The Past ◽  
Ownership Patterns ◽  
Agrarian Structure

Students of the land ownership patterns in Pakistan have always been hampered by extreme lack of data, neither the 1960 census nor the 1972 census reveal anything about the actual ownership structure of land. Khan's book goes some distance in providing numbers on land ownership (for 1971 and 1976), and also documents methods and failures of land reform efforts over the past century in Pakistan, disaggregated to show efforts in this regard in both the provinces of Sind and Punjab. The book actually provides an overwhelming amount of data - some 87 pages of charts and tables document a book of under 200 pages of text.

Economic Institutions and Growth Nexus: The Role of Governance and Democratic Institutions—Evidence from Time Varying Parameters’ (TVPs) Models

2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (4I-II) ◽  
pp. 675-688
Author(s):  
Ghulam Murtaza ◽  
Muhammad Zahir Faridi
Keyword(s):  
Structural Changes ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Dynamic Relationship ◽  
Rolling Window

The present study has investigated the channels through which the linkage between economic institutions and growth is gauged, by addressing the main hypothesis of the study that whether quality of governance and democratic institutions set a stage for economic institutions to promote the long-term growth process in Pakistan. To test the hypothesis empirically, our study models the dynamic relationship between growth and economic institutions in a time varying framework in order to capture institutional developments and structural changes occurred in the economy of Pakistan over the years. Study articulates that, along with some customary specifics, the quality of government and democracy are the substantial factors that affect institutional quality and ultimately cause to promote growth in Pakistan. JEL Classification: O40; P16; C14; H10 Keywords: Economic Institutions, Growth, Governance and Democracy, Rolling Window Two-stage Least Squares, Pakistan

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