Ex-Ante Pre Managed Earnings Benchmarks and Earnings Management of Australian Firms

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lan Sun ◽  
Subhrendu Rath
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks

Long-Term Orientation and Earnings Management Strategies

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Haga ◽  
Fredrik Huhtamäki ◽  
Dennis Sundvik
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Precision ◽  
Management Strategy ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT In this study, we investigate how country-level long-term orientation affects managers' willingness to engage in earnings management and choice of earnings management strategy. Using a comprehensive dataset of 47 countries for the period from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms in long-term-oriented cultures rely relatively more on earnings management through accruals, while firms in short-term-oriented cultures engage in relatively more real earnings management. Furthermore, we find a larger discontinuity around earnings benchmarks in long-term-oriented cultures suggesting that manipulation of accruals enables benchmark beating with high precision. JEL Classifications: M14; M16; M21; M41.

Motivations for Classification Shifting: A Systematic Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Nisreen Mohammed Almaleeh
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Special Items ◽  
Governance Environment ◽  
Classification Shifting ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks

The purpose of the current paper is to highlight the motivations that may encourage managements of firms to shift core expenses to special items in order to inflate core or operating earnings i.e. to practice classification shifting, which would have an effect on the decisions of financial statements' users. This was done through conducting a systematic review on the available literature about classification shifting. The most obvious findings to emerge from this study is that management may engage in classification shifting for the reason that it is less costly than other earnings management methods, the firm being in current or potential state of financial distress, the desire of the management of the firm to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, the ownership structure of the firm having some characteristics that encourage management to engage in such a practice, the firm performing in a weak corporate governance environment, or due to the fact that classification shifting is tough to be detected by external monitors compared to other earnings management methods.

scholarly journals Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Cheng ◽  
Jimmy Lee ◽  
Terry Shevlin
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Team Work ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Alternative Measures

ABSTRACT We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity, including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality. JEL Classifications: G32; M40.

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

1999 ◽  
Vol 26 (7&8) ◽  
pp. 807-832 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore E. Christensen ◽  
Robert E. Hoyt ◽  
Jeffrey S. Paterson
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Social Desirability Bias and Earnings Management around the World

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paweł Niszczota
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Social Desirability ◽  
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire ◽  
Social Desirability Scale ◽  
Corporate Earnings ◽  
The World ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Market Pressure

Abstract In this paper we test whether inter-country variation in individuals’ tendency to conform, as measured by the Lie (social desirability) scale used in the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, can explain differences in the propensity to employ corporate earnings management around the world. Such a link is feasible, given that survey data suggest executives tend to be under severe pressure to meet earnings benchmarks, to which they often succumb by engaging in earnings management (to the detriment of the company’s long-term prospects). We hypothesize that in countries where the propensity to act in a socially desirable (outsider-satisfying) way is stronger, earnings management should be more prevalent. Research results support our hypothesis, and demonstrate the existence of a positive relationship between the prevalence of earnings management in a country and the mean score of individuals from that country on the Eysenck Lie scale, which further evidences that capital market pressure is a significant determinant of earnings management.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document