Proliferation of Tail Risks and Policy Responses in EU Financial Markets

Author(s):  
Lucjan T. Orlowski

This book aims to analyse and discuss the main changes and new provisions introduced by MiFID II/MiFIR. The book chapters are grouped in a thematic way, covering the following areas: (i) investment firms and investment services, (ii) trading, (iii) supervision and enforcement, (iv) the broader view and the future of MiFID II/MiFIR.


Subject Recent developments in EU financial markets regulation. Significance EU authorities have conceded that the January 2017 deadline for implementing the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) must be pushed back, probably for a year. The postponement underlines a gap within the EU between tough rhetoric on financial market reform and the institutional ability to translate it into practice. However, EU regulators have made clear that the MiFID II delay will not spill over to slow other reforms -- for example, by moving to resolve a long-running dispute with the United States over derivatives clearing. Impacts Firms' compliance challenges will be formidable and are as yet undefined. The scope of these challenges will depend on formal adoption of the final texts of pending technical standards. The MiFID II delay vindicates concerns expressed by ESMA, and will buttress its authority.


Subject Proposed new regulatory standards for EU financial markets. Significance The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has published comprehensive new proposed technical standards, covering trading, market abuse and securities settlement. The standards aim to increase the transparency, safety and resilience of European financial markets, as well as enhance investor protection. They comprise some of the most important post-crisis regulation of financial markets. Impacts The new standards will tighten regulation of high-frequency trading and 'dark pools'. They will also cover trading in commodities, fixed income, futures and derivatives. Regulators hope that greater transparency will reduce market manipulation and enhance price discovery, promoting more efficient markets.


Significance COVID-19 dominates the scenarios for the next six months, which range from a swift sharp recovery to another dramatic fall in activity. Policy responses, financial markets, business and consumer confidence will play a role in the effort to shake off the economic disruption of the pandemic.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (01) ◽  
pp. 1640011
Author(s):  
SECK TAN ◽  
ALLEN LAI YU-HUNG

Having achieved an export-led exponential economic growth, Singapore remains vulnerable to both natural disasters and economic crises. However, the economic repercussions and policy responses to extreme events for an island nation like Singapore are not as widely known or studied. This paper illustrates that impacts of a health disaster [Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)] and an economic crisis [Global Financial Crisis (GFC)] on the Singapore economy based on selected indicators of the financial market, macroeconomy and property sector. Crises of different nature entail different policy responses of different scales and this is highlighted in the policy responses to both SARS and GFC toward economic recovery. In the case of SARS, there were preventive measures toward diseases but no reactive measures as the SARS virus was a new strain. For GFC, the policy measures were simply reactive as preventive measures failed to regulate the financial markets effectively. Our paper makes the case that the impacts of such extreme events are systemic as they affect all aspects of Singaporean society and that, moreover, the island nation is more vulnerable to these shocks than is currently acknowledged.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 521-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Moloney

Since the outset of the financial crisis, the EU financial markets regime1 has been undergoing a period of turbulence which contrasts sharply with the period of relative stability which it briefly enjoyed over 2005–2007 and post-FSAP (Financial Services Action Plan2). The FSAP reforms had been adopted. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) had emerged as an influential actor, driving some degree of supervisory coordination and co-operation and constructing a significant soft law ‘rule-book.’ And the 2007 Lamfalussy Review suggested broad political, institutional and stakeholder satisfaction with the Lamfalussy process. There was little enthusiasm for grand adventures in institutional design, albeit that supervision, an institutionally-driven concern, was presciently if belatedly emerging as a concern of the EU institutions. The Review's main concern, however, was with strengthening the pragmatic, if somewhat haphazard, network-based, ‘supervisory convergence’ model as the means for supervising the integrating EU financial market. With respect to regulation, reflecting the wider international zeitgeist pre-crisis,3 ‘Better Regulation’ and the need for a ‘regulatory pause’ were the watchwords of a Commission which, once the massive FSAP regime was safely in place, espoused the benefits of self-regulation and highlighted the risks of intervention without impact assessment, extensive consultation and evidence of market failure.4 This was most apparent with respect to credit rating agencies,5 debt market transparency,6 hedge funds,7 and clearing and settlement.8 Institutionally, a relatively sophisticated law-making apparatus, in the form of the Lamfalussy structures, a plethora of advisory bodies and stakeholder bodies (notably FIN-NET which represents the consumer and SME interest), had been established.


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