Crises, Liquidity Shocks, and Fire Sales at Financial Institutions

Author(s):  
Nicole M. Boyson ◽  
Jean Helwege ◽  
Jan Jindra
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (04) ◽  
pp. 2150002
Author(s):  
Zhongzhi Song

This paper examines the impact of banks’ lending incentives on asset prices and bank cash holdings under liquidity risk. Banks make lending decisions based on the tradeoff between costs (fire sales of illiquid assets) and benefits (high returns from bank loans). This paper shows fire sales of assets can be an endogenous outcome, even if banks are endowed with enough cash to meet liquidity shocks. This paper also helps explain why banks have kept a large amount of cash without lending after government capital injections in the 2008 financial crisis. The model further provides policy implications for government intervention.


Author(s):  
Nicole M. Boyson ◽  
Jean Helwege ◽  
Jan Jindra

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole M. Boyson ◽  
Jean Helwege ◽  
Jan Jindra

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (82) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rama Cont ◽  
Artur Kotlicki ◽  
Laura Valderrama

The traditional approach to the stress testing of financial institutions focuses on capital adequacy and solvency. Liquidity stress tests have been applied in parallel to and independently from solvency stress tests, based on scenarios which may not be consistent with those used in solvency stress tests. We propose a structural framework for the joint stress testing of solvency and liquidity: our approach exploits the mechanisms underlying the solvency-liquidity nexus to derive relations between solvency shocks and liquidity shocks. These relations are then used to model liquidity and solvency risk in a coherent framework, involving external shocks to solvency and endogenous liquidity shocks arising from these solvency shocks. We define the concept of ‘Liquidity at Risk’, which quantifies the liquidity resources required for a financial institution facing a stress scenario. Finally, we show that the interaction of liquidity and solvency may lead to the amplification of equity losses due to funding costs which arise from liquidity needs. The approach described in this study provides in particular a clear methodology for quantifying the impact of economic shocks resulting from the ongoing COVID-19 crisis on the solvency and liquidity of financial institutions and may serve as a useful tool for calibrating policy responses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (264) ◽  
Author(s):  

Norwegian banks and other financial institutions rely heavily on capital markets for liquidity and risk management. Liquidity conditions in the Norwegian financial sector are affected by central bank operations and the lending and funding activities of financial institutions, both domestically and abroad. Nearly 40 percent of the funding of Norwegian banks is obtained from market sources, using commercial paper, covered bonds, and senior unsecured bonds issued both domestically and abroad. Correspondingly, money markets, foreign exchange (FX) swap markets and bond markets are crucial to the credit intermediation process and a dislocation in these markets—the inability of financial institutions to roll over, or obtain new, funding—could have significant consequences for financial stability. Against this background, this note analyzes core funding markets for Norwegian banks and assesses Norges Bank’s capacity to manage systemic liquidity conditions and counteract liquidity shocks in normal times and in times of stress.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mackenzie Humble

In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con- sumer Protection Act restructured the regulatory regime for fi- nancial institutions in the United States by mandating corpo- rate governance reforms and requiring that firms maintain high levels of high-quality capital reserves in their U.S. legal entities. Likely the most consequential of the statute’s provi- sions was that which authorized Regulation YY, a landmark regulation that transformed capital planning and risk man- agement processes among financial institutions in the United States. Along with implementing enhanced prudential stand- ards for the U.S. operations of large, complex financial insti- tutions, Regulation YY altered the corporate structure of for- eign banking organizations (“FBOs”) by requiring large foreign banking institutions to establish a new legal entity, called an intermediate holding company (“IHC”). Put simply, IHCs were created to reorganize and capture, in one umbrella legal entity, all non-branch U.S. operations of FBOs. Further, to ensure robust, localized oversight of U.S. operations, each IHC is required to establish their own board of directors and risk committee, separate and apart from the board and com- mittees of the broader organization. IHCs are also required to comply with both the capital and leverage ratio requirements applied to similarly large domestic financial institutions, and the programmatic requirements associated with firms of that size (resolution planning, CCAR, CLAR). There is another regulation, though, that when coupled with the far-reaching implications of Regulation YY has dis- parately impacted foreign banking organizations. That regu- lation is Regulation W, a longstanding regulation that limits the amount of intracompany transactions banking organiza- tions can engage in. Following the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Regulation W was amended in several ways which limited spe- cifically the types of transactions that FBOs often engage in with their affiliates to manage their liquidity risk and to ab- sorb liquidity shocks. The post-crisis changes made to Regula- tion W have already begun to be rolled back by U.S. regulators, however there has not yet been a detailed analysis of how spe- cifically the interaction between Regulation YY and Regulation W undermines global financial stability. The specific aim of this Note is to evaluate whether Regu- lation YY and Regulation W have destabilized the global fi- nancial system. Institutions’ 2018 and 2019 CCAR results will be the lens through which the impact of the regulations is eval- uated. Specifically, we look at both institutions’ Tier 1 capital ratios and Tier 1 leverage ratios to assess how specifically the IHCs have positioned their liquid capital and adjusted their business model in response to Regulation YY reorganization. Ultimately, we conclude that the interaction between Regula- tion YY and the revised Regulation W has dramatically frag- mented the global flow of capital among FBOs. Regulation YY’s IHC reorganization mandate largely cabins foreign banks’ ability to absorb liquidity shocks through their organi- zations—a result that may pose a serious threat to global fi- nancial stability. That is, the fundamental disruption of insti- tutions’ ability to funnel liquidity to their network of legal entities around the world raises a significant concern regard- ing their resiliency during periods of stress, particularly for those systemically important firms who experienced pervasive liquidity issues in the most recent crisis.  


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 857-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Boyson ◽  
Jean Helwege ◽  
Jan Jindra

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