The Role of Managerial Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Sunder ◽  
Shyam V. Sunder ◽  
Liang Tan
Keyword(s):  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence

scholarly journals The Role of Debt Covenant in Moderating the Effects of Poilitical Cost on Accounting Conservatism

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 505-510
Author(s):  
Nur Fatwa Basar ◽  
Andi Hendro
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Political Cost ◽  
Debt Covenant

The purpose of this study was to analyze the direct effect of political cost and debt covenant on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study also analyzes the role of debt covenants as a moderator between the effect of political cost on accounting conservatism. The companies that are the samples are companies indexed on the IDX30 other than financial services companies and companies with non-rupiah financial reports. the data used is secondary data from the financial statements of 20 companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. data analysis using multiple linear regression and analysis of variance. The results showed that political cost directly affects accounting conservatism positively and significantly. whereas debt covenant does not have a direct significant effect on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study shows the role of debt covenants in strengthening the effect of political costs on accounting conservatism.

scholarly journals Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 37-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrike Malmendier ◽  
Geoffrey Tate
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Corporate Investment ◽  
Financing Constraints ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence ◽  
Empirical Framework

In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical framework that allows us to synthesize and assess the burgeoning literature on CEO overconfidence. We also provide novel empirical evidence that overconfidence matters for corporate investment decisions in a framework that explicitly addresses the endogeneity of firms' financing constraints.

How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants

2008 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 2085-2121 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUDHEER CHAVA ◽  
MICHAEL R. ROBERTS
Keyword(s):  
Debt Covenants

On the Verges of Overconfidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrike Malmendier ◽  
Timothy Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Trading Volume ◽  
Market Returns ◽  
Empirical Measures ◽  
Stock Market Returns ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence ◽  
Rule Out

This symposium provides several examples of overconfidence in certain economic contexts. Michael Grubb looks at “Overconfident Consumers in the Marketplace.” Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate consider “Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence.” Kent Daniel and David Hirshleifer discuss “Overconfident Investors, Predictable Returns, and Excessive Trading.” A number of insights and lessons emerge for our understanding of markets, public policy, and welfare. How do firms take advantage of consumer overconfidence? Might government attempts to rule out such practices end up providing benefits to some consumers but imposing costs on others? How are empirical measures of CEO overconfidence related to investment and the capital structure of firms? Can overconfidence among at least some investors help to explain prominent anomalies in stock markets like high levels of trading volume and certain predictable patterns in stock market returns?

R&D investment and future firm performance: The role of managerial overconfidence and government ownership

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (7) ◽  
pp. 1269-1281
Author(s):  
Imen Tebourbi ◽  
Irene Wei Kiong Ting ◽  
Hanh Thi My Le ◽  
Qian Long Kweh
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence ◽  
D Investment
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