Finding Profit-Maximizing Strategies for the Artificial Payment Card Market

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova ◽  
Edward P. K. Tsang ◽  
Andreas Krause
2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Özlem Bedre-Defolie ◽  
Emilio Calvano

Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial “interchange” fees to cardholders' banks on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, oversubsidizing card usage and overtaxing merchants. We show that this distortion is systematic and arises from the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage), whereas merchants make only one (membership). In general, we contribute to the theory of two-sided markets by introducing a model that distinguishes between extensive and intensive margins, thereby explaining why two-part tariffs are useful pricing tools for platforms. (JEL D42, D85, G21, L12)


2011 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 70-81
Author(s):  
Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova ◽  
Edward Tsang ◽  
Andreas Krause

2018 ◽  
pp. 48-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. V. Trofimov

The article analyzes tendencies of national payment systems development in the European Union and Russia: electronic and deposit money, bank cards, financial technologies in the field of retail payments. The author identifies factors that stimulate the development of cashless retail payments and the national payment card systems in the European Union, as well as the problems and prospects of this sector forming in Russia. Recommendations on the development of a competitive environment and financial technologies in the field of retail payments in Russia are proposed.


Author(s):  
Riley Crane ◽  
Juan V. Escobar-Sotomayor ◽  
Didier Sornette
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Lynn Hannan

This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to provide higher effort and whether firm profit moderates this relation. Consistent with gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) models, my experimental results show that workers provided more effort when they were paid higher wages even though there was no ex post financial reward for doing so. Moreover, firm profit influenced the relation between wages and effort. Workers provided higher effort when firm profit decreased compared to when it increased. This suggests that the degree of reciprocity is affected by firm profit. However, workers' responded asymmetrically to firm profit, in that they behaved as if they expected to share in firm profit increases but not decreases. Although firms were fairly adept at predicting the profit-maximizing wage strategy, they apparently did not anticipate workers' reluctance to share in firm profit decreases.


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