Influence Activities and Favoritism in Subjective Performance Evaluation: Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprises

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Du ◽  
Guliang Tang ◽  
S. Mark Young
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Subjective Performance Evaluation ◽  
Chinese State ◽  
Influence Activities

Influence Activities and Favoritism in Subjective Performance Evaluation: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1555-1588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Du ◽  
Guliang Tang ◽  
S. Mark Young
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Chief Financial Officers ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Geographic Proximity ◽  
Evaluation Scores ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Subjective Performance Evaluation ◽  
Chinese State ◽  
Influence Activities

ABSTRACT This study addresses the two-way process in which a subordinate and a superior engage in influence activities (bottom-up) and favoritism (top-down) in subjective Performance Evaluation. The research context is the Chinese government's evaluation of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of China (SASAC). We analyze archival records of the government's evaluation scores, score adjustments, and evaluation ratings given to 63 SOEs between 2005 and 2007. These analyses are also interpreted based on insights gained from in-depth field interviews with SASAC officials and chief financial officers (CFOs) of SOEs. Results indicate that the political connection of SOE CFOs, the geographic proximity of SOE headquarters to the SASAC central office, and political rank of the firm affect the SASAC's evaluations. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement.

scholarly journals Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance

2013 ◽  
pp. 396-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Gibbs
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Employee Selection ◽  
Job Design ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Practical Implementation ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Subjective Performance Evaluation

A large, mature and robust economics literature now provides a useful framework for understanding incentives. This chapter uses the lessons of that literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance in practice. A unified treatment of properties of numeric performance measures is provided, including how performance measures relate to employee knowledge and decision making. Subjective performance evaluation, and the tie of evaluations to rewards, are analyzed. Practical implementation issues, such as matching of pay for performance to job design, motivating creativity, and links between incentives and employee selection, are considered. The chapter concludes with suggested directions for future research.

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