scholarly journals Do the Selfish Mimic Cooperators? Experimental Evidence from Finitely-Repeated Labor Markets

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Roe ◽  
Steven Y. Wu
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Experimental Evidence

scholarly journals Team Production in International Labor Markets: Experimental Evidence from the Field

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 70-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Lyons
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Skill Sets ◽  
International Labor ◽  
Team Organization ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Nationally Diverse

Coworkers are increasingly diverse in their nationality and skill sets. This paper studies the effect of diversity on how workers are organized using data from a field experiment conducted in an environment where diversity is pervasive. Findings show that team organization improves outcomes when workers are from the same country. The opposite is true when workers are nationally diverse. These results are more pronounced for teams of workers with specialized skills. Further investigation of the data suggests that nationally diverse teams have difficulty communicating. (JEL D83, F23, F66, J24, M16, M54)

Do Job Candidates' Effort Promises Matter When the Labor Market is Competitive? Experimental Evidence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus C. Arnold ◽  
Robert A. Grasser
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Hiring Decisions ◽  
Job Candidates ◽  
Develop Theory ◽  
Work Relationship ◽  
Promise Keeping ◽  
Total Effort

Using an experiment, we investigate whether job candidates' noncontractible effort promises increase their actual effort in the work relationship when the labor market is competitive. Due to promise-keeping preferences, individuals tend to keep promises even if doing so is costly. However, when promises can be made strategically to influence hiring decisions, it is unclear whether workers are less likely to keep their promises. We develop theory to predict that making effort promises matters even more when labor markets are competitive. We find workers promise higher effort levels when competing for a job than when they do not, but do not keep promises to a lesser extent although the costs of promise-keeping increase with the promise size, thereby increasing the total effort provided. The results enhance our understanding of the effects of worker-employer communication during hiring, particularly in a competitive setting in which such communication is most likely to occur.

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