Corporate Choice of Banks: Decision Factors, Decision Maker, and Decision Process – First Evidence

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. G. Ongena ◽  
Gunseli Tumer-Alkan ◽  
Bram Vermeer
2004 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 275-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC H. KESSLER

This paper presents a multi-level decision making perspective of the innovation process. First, by considering the innovation process as a type of decision. Second, by viewing innovation as composed of multiple decision processes. Third, by analyzing innovation in terms of decision domains that "enable" innovation and that "execute" innovation. Fourth, by discussing how decision factors act as determinants of innovation. Implications are discussed and propositions are offered which consider several critical tasks in the successful management of innovation decision process(es).


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Q. Yu ◽  
Jason Dana ◽  
Joseph W. Kable

AbstractThough the ventromedial frontal lobes (VMF) are clearly important for decision-making, the precise causal role of the VMF in the decision process has still not yet fully been established. Previous studies have suggested that individuals with VMF damage violate a hallmark axiom of rational decisions by having intransitive preferences (i.e., preferring A to B, B to C, but C to A), as these individuals are more likely to make cyclical choices (i.e., choosing C over A after previously choosing A over B and B over C). However, these prior studies cannot properly distinguish between two possibilities regarding effects of VMF damage: are individuals with VMF damage prone to choosing irrationally, or are their preferences simply more variable? We had individuals with focal VMF damage, individuals with other frontal damage, and healthy controls make repeated choices across three categories – artwork, chocolate bar brands, and gambles. Using sophisticated tests of transitivity, we find that, without exception, individuals with VMF damage made rational decisions consistent with transitive preferences, even though they more frequently exhibit choice cycles due to a greater variability in their preferences across time. That is, the VMF is necessary for having strong and reliable preferences across time and context, but not for being a rational decision maker. We conclude that VMF damage affects the noisiness with which value is assessed, but not the consistency with which value is sought.Significance statementThe VMF is a part of the brain that is thought to be one of the most important for preference-based choice. Despite this, whether it is needed to make rational choices at all is unknown. Previous studies have not discriminated between different possibilities regarding the critical necessary role that the VMF plays in value-based choice. Our study shows that individuals with VMF damage still make rational decisions consistent with what they prefer, but their choices are more variable and less reliable. That is, the VMF is important for the noisiness with which value is assessed, but not the consistency with which value is sought. This result has widespread implications for rethinking the role of VMF in decision-making.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Bialek ◽  
Artur Domurat ◽  
Ethan Andrew Meyers

In this chapter, the way people consider possibilities in decision making are unpacked and explored. It begins by outlining the concept of rational choice – what a decision maker ought to choose. Specifically, it discusses how, for a given decision, a rational choice can (or cannot) be determined. Whether people often make rational choices, and what can be done to shift people toward making rational choices more often. The chapter also portrays decision making in a human light: explaining how defining a rational choice and the decision process are constrained by human biology and behavior. The steps required to make a decision are delineated, and at each step, it is briefly discussed when and how people can diverge from what they ought to be doing or choosing. The chapter closes by discussing how people evaluate decisions after they have made them and the factors that affect the evaluation.


1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-226
Author(s):  
Donald L. Ashbaugh

Problems associated with determining an appropriate salary level for local elected officials are discussed. A decision process utilizing prevailing wage rates is presented as a means to assist decision makers responsible for setting salaries for elected officials. The process retains administrative discretion for the decision maker while providing a framework from which to operate.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Vennesson ◽  
Amanda Huan

Can we trust the operational intuitions of generals? The proponents of the overconfidence model, one of the most influential perspectives in the psychology of judgment, commonly offer a skeptical answer. Generals’ operational intuitions are likely to be hampered by overconfidence and negatively affect military effectiveness. However, the successful operational outcome of General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon (June–September 1950) seemingly contradicts the model. We seek to complement and refine the overconfidence model by examining the Inchon landing decision through the analytical lens of the recognition-primed decision model. This model typically envisions that under specific circumstances—notably an experienced decision maker, an adequate environment regularity, and an opportunity to learn—generals are able to make quick and satisfactory decisions. We show that such a configuration was present in the Inchon landing case and helps explain both the decision process and its successful outcome.


2020 ◽  
pp. 73-99
Author(s):  
Samuel Zimmerman ◽  
Tomer Ullman

Deciding to undergo a transformative experience present unique challenges for a reasonable decision-maker, and for any attempt to give a formal account of how people can make such decisions. This chapter focuses on the challenges of novelty and change. It develops a normative hierarchical model for decision-making over novel objects, and show how it captures the commonsense intuition that we can rationally decide to try a new experience, but also that such decisions can be graded in difficulty. It then presents a framework for how people can think about big decisions that will affect their core beliefs, desires, and ultimately themselves, by modeling this as a decision process of choosing between different selves. Empirical evidence is used to refine different sub-models of this meta-reasoning process, including the asymmetric treatment of current and future utilities, the difference between future utilities and future beliefs, and a distance function between selves that is separate from considerations of future happiness.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
April L. Wright ◽  
Raymond F. Zammuto ◽  
Peter W. Liesch ◽  
Stuart Middleton ◽  
Paul Hibbert ◽  
...  

Ergonomics ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. P. SCHRENK

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