scholarly journals Individuals with ventromedial frontal damage have more unstable but still fundamentally transitive preferences

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Q. Yu ◽  
Jason Dana ◽  
Joseph W. Kable

AbstractThough the ventromedial frontal lobes (VMF) are clearly important for decision-making, the precise causal role of the VMF in the decision process has still not yet fully been established. Previous studies have suggested that individuals with VMF damage violate a hallmark axiom of rational decisions by having intransitive preferences (i.e., preferring A to B, B to C, but C to A), as these individuals are more likely to make cyclical choices (i.e., choosing C over A after previously choosing A over B and B over C). However, these prior studies cannot properly distinguish between two possibilities regarding effects of VMF damage: are individuals with VMF damage prone to choosing irrationally, or are their preferences simply more variable? We had individuals with focal VMF damage, individuals with other frontal damage, and healthy controls make repeated choices across three categories – artwork, chocolate bar brands, and gambles. Using sophisticated tests of transitivity, we find that, without exception, individuals with VMF damage made rational decisions consistent with transitive preferences, even though they more frequently exhibit choice cycles due to a greater variability in their preferences across time. That is, the VMF is necessary for having strong and reliable preferences across time and context, but not for being a rational decision maker. We conclude that VMF damage affects the noisiness with which value is assessed, but not the consistency with which value is sought.Significance statementThe VMF is a part of the brain that is thought to be one of the most important for preference-based choice. Despite this, whether it is needed to make rational choices at all is unknown. Previous studies have not discriminated between different possibilities regarding the critical necessary role that the VMF plays in value-based choice. Our study shows that individuals with VMF damage still make rational decisions consistent with what they prefer, but their choices are more variable and less reliable. That is, the VMF is important for the noisiness with which value is assessed, but not the consistency with which value is sought. This result has widespread implications for rethinking the role of VMF in decision-making.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Bialek ◽  
Artur Domurat ◽  
Ethan Andrew Meyers

In this chapter, the way people consider possibilities in decision making are unpacked and explored. It begins by outlining the concept of rational choice – what a decision maker ought to choose. Specifically, it discusses how, for a given decision, a rational choice can (or cannot) be determined. Whether people often make rational choices, and what can be done to shift people toward making rational choices more often. The chapter also portrays decision making in a human light: explaining how defining a rational choice and the decision process are constrained by human biology and behavior. The steps required to make a decision are delineated, and at each step, it is briefly discussed when and how people can diverge from what they ought to be doing or choosing. The chapter closes by discussing how people evaluate decisions after they have made them and the factors that affect the evaluation.


Author(s):  
Christopher R. Sheldrick ◽  
Justeen Hyde ◽  
Laurel K. Leslie ◽  
Thomas Mackie

Many of the resources developed to promote the use of evidence in policy aspire to an ideal of rational decision making, yet their basis in the decision sciences is often unclear. Tracing the historical development of evidence-informed policy to its roots in evidence-based medicine (EBM), we distinguish between two understandings of how research evidence may be applied. Advocates for EBM all seek to use research evidence to optimise clinical care. However, some proponents argue that ‘uptake' of research evidence should be direct and universal, for example through wide-scale implementation of ‘evidence-based practices'. In contrast, other conceptualisations of EBM are rooted in expected utility theory, which defines rational decisions as choices that are expected to result in the greatest benefit. Applying this theory to medical care, clinical decision-making models clearly demonstrate that rational decisions require not only a range of relevant evidence, but also expertise to inform judgments regarding the credibility of estimates and to assess fit-to-context, and stakeholder preferences and values to weigh trade-offs among competing outcomes. Using these models as exemplars, we argue that attempts to apply research evidence directly to practice or policy without consideration of expert judgement or preferences and values reflect fundamental misconceptions about the theory of rational decision making that can impede implementation. In turn, the decision sciences highlight the need to consider the role of expertise and judgment when interpreting research evidence, the role of preferences and values when applying it to specific decisions, and the practical limits imposed by the uncertainty inherent in each.<br /><br />key messages<br /><ol><li>Uncertainty is inherent to research evidence and to decision making.</li><br /><li>Rational decisions require judgment to interpret evidence and stakeholder values to apply evidence.</li><br /><li>Decisions can be sensitive to evidence, expertise, and/or preferences and values to varying degrees.</li><br /></ol>


Author(s):  
Hans Liljenström

AbstractWhat is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what “you” decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.


1989 ◽  
Vol 82 (5) ◽  
pp. 260-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
H J Sutherland ◽  
H A Llewellyn-Thomas ◽  
G A Lockwood ◽  
D L Tritchler ◽  
J E Till

The relationship between cancer patients’ desire for information and their preference for participation in decision making has been examined. Approximately 77% of the 52 patients reported that they had participated in decision making to the extent that they wished, while most of the remaining 23% would have preferred an opportunity to have greater input. Although many of the patients actively sought information, a majority preferred the physician to assume the role of the primary decision maker. Ethically, the disclosure of information has been assumed to be necessary for autonomous decision making. Nevertheless, the results of this study indicate that patients may actively seek information to satisfy an as yet unidentified aspect of psychological autonomy that does not necessarily include participation in decision making.


2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 724
Author(s):  
Joanna M. Spanjaard ◽  
Sarah A. McAlister-Smiley

A level-headed decision maker in a well-run gas business would appear to be a good candidate to navigate through change. But instinctive responses and overconfidence can lead to irrational decision making. During periods of greatest risk, at the moment rationality is needed most, the impulse to act irrationally kicks in. This paper explores how diversity can alleviate risks associated with ‘sharks’ and ‘bandwagons’ in the gas sector. It explores the Queensland gas sector and how diversity of thought can play a powerful role in reducing the impact of bias on identifying risk and making rational decisions. It also offers practical advice as to how the gas sector can improve diversity and metaphorically punch those sharks and halt those bandwagons.


1993 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 380-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jackie Kowalski ◽  
Arnold Oates

As school-based management and collaborative decision making are implemented in the educational system, the role of the superintendent will take on a new look. The superintendent will become a leader of leaders and a collaborative decision maker. The author explores the necessary leadership characteristics and skills of the superintendent in this new role.


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
MEGHAN C. CAMPBELL ◽  
JULIE C. STOUT ◽  
PETER R. FINN

We examined the possible role of autonomic activity in Huntington's disease (HD) during a risky decision making task. Skin conductance responses (SCRs) of 15 HD participants and 16 healthy controls were measured while they performed a computerized version of the Simulated Gambling Task (SGT). The results replicated our previous finding of a performance decrement in HD, and showed that HD was associated with an altered pattern of SCRs during the risky decision task. Specifically, the healthy controls produced increased SCRs following selections from the disadvantageous decks and following losing selections. In contrast, the SCRs of the HD group did not differentiate between wins and losses. These findings indicate a reduced impact of loss on decision-making processes under risky conditions in HD. (JINS, 2004, 10, 239–245.)


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 2863-2894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Shea-Brown ◽  
Mark S. Gilzenrat ◽  
Jonathan D. Cohen

Previous theoretical work has shown that a single-layer neural network can implement the optimal decision process for simple, two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks. However, it is likely that the mammalian brain comprises multilayer networks, raising the question of whether and how optimal performance can be approximated in such an architecture. Here, we present theoretical work suggesting that the noradrenergic nucleus locus coeruleus (LC) may help optimize 2AFC decision making in the brain. This is based on the observations that neurons of the LC selectively fire following the presentation of salient stimuli in decision tasks and that the corresponding release of norepinephrine can transiently increase the responsivity, or gain, of cortical processing units. We describe computational simulations that investigate the role of such gain changes in optimizing performance of 2AFC decision making. In the tasks we model, no prior cueing or knowledge of stimulus onset time is assumed. Performance is assessed in terms of the rate of correct responses over time (the reward rate). We first present the results of a single-layer model that accumulates (integrates) sensory input and implements the decision process as a threshold crossing. Gain transients, representing the modulatory effect of the LC, are driven by separate threshold crossings in this layer. We optimize over all free parameters to determine the maximum reward rate achievable by this model and compare it to the maximum reward rate when gain is held fixed. We find that the dynamic gain mechanism yields no improvement in reward for this single-layer model. We then examine a two-layer model, in which competing sensory accumulators in the first layer (capable of implementing the task relevant decision) pass activity to response accumulators in a second layer. Again, we compare a version in which threshold crossing in the first (decision) layer elicits an LC response (and a concomitant increase in gain) with a fixed-gain version of the model. Here, we find that gain transients modeling the LC phasic response yield an improvement in reward rate of 12% to 24%. Furthermore, we show that the timing characteristics of these gain transients agree with observations concerning LC firing patterns reported in recent experimental studies. This provides converging evidence for the hypothesis that the LC optimizes processes underlying 2AFC decision making in multilayer networks.


2013 ◽  
Vol 99 (3) ◽  
pp. 216-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Sullivan ◽  
P Monagle ◽  
L Gillam

ObjectiveEnd-of-life decision-making is difficult for everyone involved, as many studies have shown. Within this complexity, there has been little information on how parents see the role of doctors in end-of-life decision-making for children. This study aimed to examine parents’ views and experiences of end-of-life decision-making.DesignA qualitative method with a semistructured interview design was used.SettingParent participants were living in the community.ParticipantsTwenty-five bereaved parents.Main outcomesParents reported varying roles taken by doctors: being the provider of information without opinion; giving information and advice as to the decision that should be taken; and seemingly being the decision maker for the child. The majority of parents found their child's doctor enabled them to be the ultimate decision maker for their child, which was what they very clearly wanted to be, and consequently enabled them to exercise their parental autonomy. Parents found it problematic when doctors took over decision-making. A less frequently reported, yet significant role for doctors was to affirm decisions after they had been made by parents. Other important aspects of the doctor's role were to provide follow-up support and referral.ConclusionsUnderstanding the role that doctors take in end-of-life decisions, and the subsequent impact of that role from the perspective of parents can form the basis of better informed clinical practice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
PURUWETI SIYAKTYA

Zimbabwe experienced price hyperinflation as internationally defined in the period March 2007 to January 2009. This paper addresses the issue of how this hyperinflation interacted with manufactur- ing sector performance. Interviews with a small anonymous sample of ‘survivor’ manufacturers suggest that rational decisions as responses to the internal/external structural events from 2000 induced a number of actions that tended to economize on the use of Zimbabwean dollars as the highly monetized manufacturing sector was especially exposed to monetary risks, but was also well connected with the international economy and using other currencies. Though damage to the manufacturing sector continued during the hyperinflation period it did not accelerate as might have been expected. Therefore, analytically, rational decision-making by private sector manufacturers prior to the hyperinflation may have helped protect some of them from its effects but also played a role as acause of the hyperinflation.


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