Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Royce Carroll ◽  
Jeffrey B. Lewis ◽  
James Lo ◽  
Keith T. Poole ◽  
Howard Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Parametric Bootstrap ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Measuring Bias

Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Royce Carroll ◽  
Jeffrey B. Lewis ◽  
James Lo ◽  
Keith T. Poole ◽  
Howard Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Parametric Bootstrap ◽  
Standard Errors ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Ideal Points ◽  
Measuring Bias ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Over Time

DW-NOMINATE scores for the U.S. Congress are widely used measures of legislators' ideological locations over time. These scores have been used in a large number of studies in political science and closely related fields. In this paper, we extend the work of Lewis and Poole (2004) on the parametric bootstrap to DW-NOMINATE and obtain standard errors for the legislator ideal points. These standard errors are in the range of 1%–4% of the range of DW-NOMINATE coordinates.

Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap

2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey B. Lewis ◽  
Keith T. Poole
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Parametric Bootstrap ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Standard Errors ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Political Methodology ◽  
Working Paper ◽  
Political Analysis ◽  
Measuring Bias ◽  
Quantities Of Interest

Over the last 15 years a large amount of scholarship in legislative politics has used NOMINATE or other similar methods to construct measures of legislators' ideological locations. These measures are then used in subsequent analyses. Recent work in political methodology has focused on the pitfalls of using such estimates as variables in subsequent analysis without explicitly accounting for their uncertainty and possible bias (Herron and Shotts 2003, Political Analysis 11:44–64). This presents a problem for those employing NOMINATE scores because estimates of their unconditional sampling uncertainty or bias have until now been unavailable. In this paper, we present a method of forming unconditional standard error estimates and bias estimates for NOMINATE scores using the parametric bootstrap. Standard errors are estimated for the 90th U.S. Senate in two dimensions. Standard errors of first—dimension placements are in the 0.03 to 0.08 range. The results are compared with those obtained using the Markov chain Monte Carlo estimator of Clinton et al. (2002, Stanford University Working Paper). We also show how the bootstrap can be used to construct standard errors and confidence intervals for auxiliary quantities of interest such as ranks and the location of the median senator.

Where Does the President Stand? Measuring Presidential Ideology

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Treier
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Point Estimates

Although estimating the revealed preferences of members of Congress is straightforward, estimating the position of the president relative to Congress is not. Current estimates place the president as considerably more ideologically extreme than one would expect. These estimates, however, are very sensitive to the set of presidential positions used in the roll call analyses for the 103rd through 109th Congresses. The president often obtains more moderate ideal point estimates relative to Congress when including positions based on signing bills into law.

Integrating Voting Theory and Roll Call Analysis: A Framework

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Clinton ◽  
Adam Meirowitz
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Testing Procedure ◽  
Formal Modeling ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Federal Aid ◽  
Voting Theory ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Legislative Studies ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Hypothesis Testing Procedure

Scholars of legislative studies typically use ideal point estimates from scaling procedures to test theories of legislative politics. We contend that theory and methods may be better integrated by directly incorporating maintained and to be tested hypotheses in the statistical model used to estimate legislator preferences. In this view of theory and estimation, formal modeling (1) provides auxiliary assumptions that serve as constraints in the estimation process, and (2) generates testable predictions. The estimation and hypothesis testing procedure uses roll call data to evaluate the validity of theoretically derived to be tested hypotheses in a world where maintained hypotheses are presumed true. We articulate the approach using the language of statistical inference (both frequentist and Bayesian). The approach is demonstrated in analyses of the well-studied Powell amendment to the federal aid-to-education bill in the 84th House and the Compromise of 1790 in the 1st House.

scholarly journals Change We Can Believe In? Using Political Science to Predict Policy Change in the Obama Presidency

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 329-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Woon
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Congressional Election ◽  
Partisan Polarization ◽  
Point Estimates

Based on the results of the 2008 presidential and congressional elections, an analysis using theories and methods of modern political science (pivotal politics theory, ideal point estimates, and bootstrap simulations) suggests that the conditions are ripe for real policy change. Specifically, we should expect policies to move significantly in a liberal direction, few or no policies should move in a conservative direction, and many of the outcomes will be moderate or somewhat to the left of center (rather than far left). Furthermore, the predictions depend as much on partisan polarization and the results of the congressional election as they do on the outcome of presidential election itself.

Monetary Policy Committees and Voting Behavior

2019 ◽  
pp. 38-58
Author(s):  
Sylvester Eijffinger ◽  
Ronald Mahieu ◽  
Louis Raes
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Point Estimation ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Monetary Policy Committees ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Traditional Approaches ◽  
Ideal Point Estimation

In this chapter we suggest to use Bayesian ideal point estimation to analyze voting in monetary policy committees. Using data from the Riksbank we demonstrate what this entails and we compare ideal point estimates with the results from traditional approaches. We end by suggesting possible extensions.

scholarly journals Structured-Induced Deference or Equal and Coordinate Actor: Congressional Influence on American Foreign Policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-118
Author(s):  
Eric Paul Svensen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Scholarly Attention

Perhaps no separation of powers issue receives as much scholarly attention as the near monopoly modern presidents exert over foreign policy. Yet, despite an extensive literature on the subject, scholars have drawn different conclusions as to the causes of this change, finding that lawmakers either defer to the president or are equal and coordinate actors on foreign policy. Using the separation of powers as a guide, I attempt to rectify these differences and demonstrate instances in the roll call record where examples of both explanations are most evident. Recovering ideal point estimates between the 87th and 112th Congress on votes highlighting competing governmental objectives, findings show that the chamber median frequently shifts toward the president on foreign policy votes in the final passage stage and during the treaty process. However, evidence also shows Congress is less likely to defer to the president on domestic legislation and appropriations.

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