Not Always in the People's Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements

Why are some elections followed by armed conflict, while others are not? This article begins to explore this question by mapping the prevalence of power-sharing agreements and patterns of post-election peace in states shattered by civil war. While democracy builds on the notion of free political competition and uncertain electoral outcomes, power-sharing reduces the uncertainty by ensuring political power for certain groups. Nevertheless, new data presented in this article – the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) data collection – shows that the issues of peace, power-sharing and democracy have become intertwined as the vast majority of contemporary peace agreements provide for both power-sharing and elections. First, in contrast to previous research which has suggested that power-sharing is a tool for ending violence, this study shows that conflict often continues after an agreement has been signed, even if it includes provisions for power-sharing. Second, this investigation shows no evidence of power-sharing facilitating the holding of elections. On the contrary, it is more common that elections are held following a peace process without power-sharing. Third, a period of power-sharing ahead of the elections does not seem to provide for postelection peace. Rather, such elections are similarly dangerous as post-accord elections held without a period of power-sharing. The good news is that power-sharing does not seem to have a negative effect on post-election peace.

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Demobilization Challenges After Armed Conflict

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1910 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Margit Bussmann

Keyword(s):

Armed Conflict ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Military Power ◽

Rebel Groups ◽

Peace Agreements ◽

Commitment Problem ◽

Alternative Means ◽

Decisive Victory ◽

Security Guarantees ◽

Commitment Problems

Demobilization of ex-combatants is a major obstacle in the transition to a stable postconflict society. The combatants must be convinced to abandon the armed confrontation and hand over their weapons in light of security concerns and a lack of alternative means of income. The challenges to overcoming the commitment problem differ in terms of numbers of combatants who must be demobilized for conflicts that end in a decisive victory and conflicts that reach a military stalemate. Peace agreements can offer several solutions for overcoming the parties’ commitment problems, but often the implementation of the provisions is incomplete. Third parties can offer to monitor an agreement and provide security guarantees. International actors increasingly assist with demobilization and reintegration programs for former combatants and help to overcome security-related concerns and economic challenges. Another solution offered is military power-sharing arrangements and the integration of rebel fighters into the national military. These measures are intended to reduce the pool for potential recruitment for existing or new rebel groups. If ex-combatants are left without means of income to support themselves and their families, the risk is higher that they will remobilize and conflict will recur. Reintegration in the civilian labor market, however, is often difficult in the weak economies of war-affected countries.

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Distributional effects of political power-sharing arrangements and their negative consequences for post-agreement stability

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics ◽

10.1177/2057891118765223 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

pp. 109-132

Author(s):

Kazuhiro Obayashi

Keyword(s):

Power Sharing ◽

The Political ◽

Alternative Theory ◽

Negative Consequences ◽

Distributional Effects ◽

Peace Agreements ◽

Commitment Problem ◽

Negative Effect ◽

And Shifts ◽

Peace Duration

Most of the previous studies of power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) find the political PSA to be ineffective in stabilizing post-agreement peace. These studies argue that the political PSA is a signal that is not costly enough to moderate the information asymmetry or commitment problem among the signatories. In this article, I develop an alternative theory of the political PSA that identifies its “negative” effect on post-agreement stability by highlighting two issues that have attracted little attention in the previous studies, i.e. distributional effects of the political PSA and shifts in the bargaining power among the signatories. To assess the validity of the theory, I first conduct a logistic regression analysis of inclusion of political PSA provisions in peace agreements, and then conduct a survival analysis of post-agreement peace duration.

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The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond

Africa Spectrum ◽

10.1177/000203970904400302 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 44 (3) ◽

pp. 11-39 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Chandra Lekha Sriram ◽

Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Keyword(s):

Conflict Resolution ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

International Conflict ◽

Human Security ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Short Term ◽

State Legitimacy ◽

Peace Agreements

The purpose of international conflict-resolution efforts is, in the short term, to bring an end to violent armed conflict, and, in the medium to longer term, to prevent the revival of conflict. However, at least one of the mechanisms often utilised in conflict resolution and peace agreements, power-sharing, may not only prove problematic in early negotiation and implementation, but may potentially be at odds with the longer-term goal of preventing resurgence of conflict. Why might this be the case? Longer-term peacebuilding seeks to prevent conflict in part by building strong and sustainable states. Such states should be able to avoid reverting to armed conflict because they would be more responsive to grievances and more effective in dealing with violent dissent. However, power-sharing arrangements may undermine such efforts by placing in power individuals and groups not fully committed to, or unable to take part in, governance for the benefit of the entire populace; in part because it necessarily places in power those who have engaged in significant violence to achieve their ends. This is likely to create less democratic states, although we do not insist that democracy is or should be the only goal of peacebuilders. Rather, we suggest that power-sharing arrangements may tend not only towards undemocratic states, but towards states which are not responsive to the needs of the citizenry for security in ways which may undermine human security and state legitimacy.

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The implementation of the random survival forests in conflict management data: An examination of power sharing and third party mediation in post-conflict countries

10.31235/osf.io/vyjqf ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Andrew Whetten ◽

John R Stevens ◽

Damon Cann

Keyword(s):

Machine Learning ◽

Model Selection ◽

Political Science ◽

Selection Process ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Duration Models ◽

Time To Event ◽

Peace Agreement ◽

Peace Agreements ◽

Random Survival Forest

Time-to-event analysis is a common occurrence in political science. In recent years, there has been an increased usage of machine learning methods in quantitative political science research. This article advocates for the implementation of machine learning duration models to assist in a sound model selection process. We provide a brief introduction to the random survival forest (RSF) algorithm and contrast it to a popular predecessor, the Cox proportional hazards model. We implement both methods for simulated time-to-event data and the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) to assist researchers in evaluating the merits of machine learning duration models. We provide evidence of significantly higher survival probabilities for peace agreements with 3rd party mediated design and implementation. We also detect increased survival probabilities for peace agreements that incorporate territorial power-sharing and avoid multiple rebel party signatories. Further, the RSF provides a novel approach for ranking of peace agreement criteria importance in predicting peace agreement duration. Our findings justify the robust interpretability and competitive performance of the random survival forest algorithm in numerous circumstances, in addition to promoting a diverse, holistic model-selection process for time-to-event political science data.

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The 2002–2004 Annan Plan in Cyprus

Territory and Power in Constitutional Transitions ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198836544.003.0003 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 43-59 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Neophytos Loizides ◽

John McGarry

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Human Rights ◽

United Nations ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Overwhelming Majority ◽

The European Union ◽

Peace Agreements ◽

History Of ◽

Cyprus Conflict ◽

Greek Cypriots

This chapter examines the 2002–04 Annan Plan for Cyprus, considered one of the most comprehensive peace plans in the history of the United Nations. The Annan Plan was conceived in an effort to secure agreement on a reunited federal Cyprus within the European Union. However, it was rejected during the two April 2004 referendums by the overwhelming majority (76 percent) of Greek Cypriots, although it was endorsed by 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots. The Annan Plan is significant for the wider empirical and conceptual issues it raises with regard to constitutional transitions and externally mediated peace agreements. The chapter first provides a background on the Cyprus conflict before discussing the constitutional negotiations around the Annan Plan and its unintended outcomes. It also highlights the broader lessons imparted by the process, pointing in particular to the Annan Plan’s provisions on power-sharing, sovereignty, security, and human rights.

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A Compromised Peace? The Effect of Power-Sharing Arrangements on Post-War Violence

10.31235/osf.io/s48hz ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Martin Ottmann

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Quantitative Analysis ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Access To Resources ◽

Privileged Access ◽

Economy Model ◽

Political Actors ◽

Peace Agreements ◽

Theoretical Reasoning ◽

Post War

How does power-sharing between government and rebels affect the use of violence by political actors outside of peace agreements? To address this puzzle, I propose a political economy model of power-sharing and post-war violence. Power-sharing regulates elites' access to state resources and thus determines whether government and rebels can successfully suppress post-war rebellions. Personalized power-sharing gives elites privileged access to state resources, facilitates effective counter-insurgency strategies, and thus decreases post-war violence. In contrast, structural power-sharing limits elites' access to resources and their ability to prevent armed challenges resulting in higher levels of post-war violence. I test these propositions with a quantitative analysis of peace agreements in Africa and Asia signed between 1990 and 2006. The statistical findings lend support to my theoretical reasoning.

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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan

Africa Spectrum ◽

10.1177/000203970904400307 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 44 (3) ◽

pp. 133-147 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Einas Ahmed

Keyword(s):

Power Sharing ◽

Transitional Period ◽

Political Transformation ◽

Peace Agreement ◽

The North ◽

Post Conflict ◽

Peace Agreements ◽

Political Forces ◽

The Government ◽

Democratic Transformation

Most of the researches on peace agreements conclude that power-sharing arrangements included in these are mostly to the detriment of long-term democratic transformation. The basic argument of these studies is that peace deals consolidate mainly the power of the signatories to the detriment of other major political forces. This article illustrates that, in contrast to many cases, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in 2005 between the government of Sudan represented by the ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), has led to an important political transformation in state structure as well as in power relations. Although the CPA enhanced the legitimacy of the SPLM and the NCP and consolidated their political domination, it, nevertheless, contributed to a significant political opening for other political forces in the North and in the South. The CPA put an end to the historically exclusive political hegemony of the North. This article focuses on the dynamics of relations between the SPLM and the NCP during the transitional period and illustrates how these dynamics have impacted upon the process of political transformation.

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