scholarly journals External Referencing and Pharmaceutical Price Negotiation

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Begoña Mariñoso ◽  
Izabela Jelovac ◽  
Pau Olivella
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Price ◽  
Price Negotiation

scholarly journals External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation

2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 737-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Begoña Garcia Mariñoso ◽  
Izabela Jelovac ◽  
Pau Olivella
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Price ◽  
Price Negotiation

Lowering the bucks for the bang: viewing pharmaceutical price negotiations through a behavioural lens

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADAM OLIVER
Keyword(s):  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Important Influence ◽  
Pharmaceutical Price ◽  
Price Negotiation ◽  
Price Negotiations ◽  
Behavioural Economic ◽  
Behavioural Factors

Abstract This article is a speculative perspective on the behavioural factors that may influence price negotiations between pharmaceutical ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’. It is contended that several behavioural economic-related phenomena may affect price negotiations, including anchoring, loss aversion, a tendency (or otherwise) to reciprocate and a concern for one's reputation. The most important influence, however, is likely to be anchoring, which will particularly benefit the seller of a product if they are allowed to set the initial anchor in a price negotiation. Consequently, it is argued that the most effective way in which to counter the seller's anchor is likely to be to regulate so that the buyer makes the first offer.

Price Negotiation with Merchant Heterogeneity in the Payment Card Industry

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Chun-Yu Ho ◽  
Li Xu ◽  
Daiqiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Penetration Rate ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Substantial Variation ◽  
Payment Card ◽  
Price Negotiation ◽  
Over Time

We examine price negotiation in the payment card industry by exploiting a unique merchant-, industry-, and city-level dataset. Motivated by the substantial variation in acquirer fees and the heterogeneous merchant card transactions, we use Nash bargaining to model the negotiation over the acquirer fee between an acquirer and a merchant. We find that the merchants secure a larger incremental surplus than the acquirer on average. Moreover, merchants might face upward pressure on acquirer fees as the card penetration rate rises over time, and policies that weaken the acquirer's bargaining power could relieve the upward fee pressure.

scholarly journals An EV Charging Scheduling Mechanism Based on Price Negotiation

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baocheng Wang ◽  
Yafei Hu ◽  
Yu Xiao ◽  
Yi Li
Keyword(s):  
Price Negotiation ◽  
Ev Charging
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