Price Negotiation with Merchant Heterogeneity in the Payment Card Industry

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Chun-Yu Ho ◽  
Li Xu ◽  
Daiqiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Penetration Rate ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Substantial Variation ◽  
Payment Card ◽  
Price Negotiation ◽  
Over Time

We examine price negotiation in the payment card industry by exploiting a unique merchant-, industry-, and city-level dataset. Motivated by the substantial variation in acquirer fees and the heterogeneous merchant card transactions, we use Nash bargaining to model the negotiation over the acquirer fee between an acquirer and a merchant. We find that the merchants secure a larger incremental surplus than the acquirer on average. Moreover, merchants might face upward pressure on acquirer fees as the card penetration rate rises over time, and policies that weaken the acquirer's bargaining power could relieve the upward fee pressure.

scholarly journals Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Speed Of Convergence ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Dynamic Version ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.

scholarly journals Coding Variation and Adherence to Methodological Standards in Cardiac Research Using the National Inpatient Sample

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Ostrominski ◽  
Javier Amione-Guerra ◽  
Brian Hernandez ◽  
Joel E. Michalek ◽  
Anand Prasad
Keyword(s):  
Artery Bypass ◽  
Coronary Intervention ◽  
National Inpatient Sample ◽  
Substantial Variation ◽  
Case Definitions ◽  
Unique Case ◽  
Percutaneous Coronary ◽  
Trends Over Time ◽  
Administrative Code ◽  
Over Time

Background: Code selection is crucial to the accuracy and reproducibility of studies using administrative data, however a comprehensive assessment of coding trends for major cardiac diagnoses and procedures is lacking. We aimed to evaluate trends in administrative code utilization for major cardiac diagnoses and procedures, and adherence to required methodological practices in cardiac research using the National Inpatient Sample (NIS).Methods: In this observational study of 445 articles, ICD-9-CM codes corresponding to acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, atrial fibrillation, percutaneous coronary intervention, and coronary artery bypass grafting were collected and analyzed. The NIS was used to compare the number of hospitalizations between the most frequently encountered AMI case definitions. Key elements were abstracted from each article to evaluate adherence to required methodological practices.Results: Variation in code utilization was observed for each diagnosis and procedure assessed, and the number of unique case definitions published per year increased throughout the study period (P < 0.001), driven largely by the significant increase in articles per year (P < 0.001). Off-target codes were observed in 39 (8.8%) studies. Upon reintroduction into the NIS for 2008–2012, the most commonly encountered case definitions for AMI were found to yield significantly different estimates of AMI hospitalizations and hospitalization trends over time. Three hundred and ninety-nine articles (84%) did not adhere to one or more required research practices. Overall adherence was superior for publications in higher-impact journals (P = 0.002).Conclusions: Substantial variation in code selection exists for major cardiac diagnoses and procedures, and non-adherence to methodological standards is widespread. These data have important implications for the accuracy and generalizability of analyses using the NIS.

Testing the bargaining hypothesis in the manufacturing sector in developing countries

1987 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Kobrin
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
National Study ◽  
Global Integration ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Cross National Study ◽  
Over Time

The bargaining power model of HC–MNC (host country–multinational corporation) interaction conceives of economic nationalism in terms of rational self-interest and assumes both inherent conflict and convergent objectives. In extractive industries, there is strong evidence that outcomes are a function of relative bargaining power and that as power shifts to developing HCs over time, the bargain obsolesces. A cross-national study of the bargaining model, using data from 563 subsidiaries of U.S. manufacturing firms in forty-nine developing countries, indicates that while the bargaining framework is an accurate model of MNC–host country relationships, manufacturing is not characterized by the inherent, structurally based, and secular obsolescence that is found in the natural resource industries. Shifts in bargaining power to HCs may take place when technology is mature and global integration limited. In industries characterized by changing technologies and the spread of global integration, the bargain will obsolesce very slowly and the relative power of MNCs may even increase over time.

scholarly journals Diversification rates and species richness across the Tree of Life

2016 ◽  
Vol 283 (1838) ◽  
pp. 20161334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua P. Scholl ◽  
John J. Wiens
Keyword(s):  
Species Richness ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Tree Of Life ◽  
Diversification Rate ◽  
Substantial Variation ◽  
Diversification Rates ◽  
Higher Taxa ◽  
Over Time

Species richness varies dramatically among clades across the Tree of Life, by over a million-fold in some cases (e.g. placozoans versus arthropods). Two major explanations for differences in richness among clades are the clade-age hypothesis (i.e. species-rich clades are older) and the diversification-rate hypothesis (i.e. species-rich clades diversify more rapidly, where diversification rate is the net balance of speciation and extinction over time). Here, we examine patterns of variation in diversification rates across the Tree of Life. We address how rates vary across higher taxa, whether rates within higher taxa are related to the subclades within them, and how diversification rates of clades are related to their species richness. We find substantial variation in diversification rates, with rates in plants nearly twice as high as in animals, and rates in some eukaryotes approximately 10-fold faster than prokaryotes. Rates for each kingdom-level clade are then significantly related to the subclades within them. Although caution is needed when interpreting relationships between diversification rates and richness, a positive relationship between the two is not inevitable. We find that variation in diversification rates seems to explain most variation in richness among clades across the Tree of Life, in contrast to the conclusions of previous studies.

Book Reviews

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-215
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Drexel University ◽  
New Concepts ◽  
University Of Manchester ◽  
Transferable Utility Games ◽  
Partition Function Form

Omer Edhan of University of Manchester reviews, “Value Solutions in Cooperative Games” by Roger A. McCain. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents new concepts for cooperative game theory, with a particular focus on solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. Discusses value solutions for superadditive transferable utility games in coalition function form; Zeuthen–Nash bargaining; nontransferable utility games and games in partition function form; a Shapley value algorithm for games in partition function form; extension of the nucleolus to nontransferable utility games in partition function form; a core imputation with variable bargaining power; bargaining power biform games; intertemporal cooperative games—a sketch of a theory; and a theory of enterprise. McCain is at Drexel University.”

Relative Bargaining Power, Corporate Restructuring, and Managerial Incentives

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Dencker
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Change ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Fortune 500 ◽  
Corporate Restructuring ◽  
Change Processes ◽  
Manufacturing Firm ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Base Salary ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Over Time

Using longitudinal personnel data from a U.S. Fortune 500 manufacturing firm for the period of 1967 to 1993, I assess the effects of corporate restructuring and power differences between a firm and its managers on the nature and use of different incentives. I extend relative bargaining power theory to predict that a firm's ability to provide incentives in the ways it prefers—bonuses instead of increases to base salary or promotions—varies due to differences over time in monitoring and sanctions stemming from organizational change processes. Findings are consistent with the theory and show a negative effect of bonuses on salary increases and of bonuses on promotions, with tradeoffs greatest when the firm's oversight of rewards was highest and termination threats were most explicit. Further support for the theory is the finding that the strength of the negative effect of bonuses on promotions varied across managerial groups due to differences in managers' bargaining power: “fast-trackers” were much less likely to experience a tradeoff than were low performing managers, and women were less likely to experience a tradeoff than were men.

scholarly journals The Overconfidence Of Boards And The Increase In CEO Pay Over Time

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1901 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory L. Nagel
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Upward Trend ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Survey Results ◽  
Over Time

This paper is based on Robert Shillers view that hiring of external CEOs is excessive due to boards overconfidence and causes reduced firm performance. External hire selections provide all CEOs with bargaining power. I show excessive external hiring provides an alternative explanation (excessive bargaining power) for the upward trend in CEO pay since 1945 that is largely consistent with the observed facts. A survey of the direct evidence on external hires performance provides uniform support for Shillers view after accounting for research supporting alternative views that only includes CEOs who survive. After adjusting for survival bias, the survey results consistently suggest that firms predominantly realize greater performance from internal promotion, all else equal. Overall, this papers findings increase support for succession through internal executive promotion, and suggest that institutional investors can expect greater bargaining power and wealth by advocating for internal hires more often.

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