Endogenous Political Economy: On the Inevitability of Inefficiency under the Natural Resource

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Fernandes
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Natural Resource

Canadian Natural Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy

1998 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 531
Author(s):  
Mark Sproule-Jones ◽  
Melody Hessing ◽  
Michael Howlett
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Natural Resource

Burning Somalia’s Future

2018 ◽  
pp. 121-148
Author(s):  
Ilya Gridneff
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Arab World ◽  
Gulf Cooperation Council ◽  
The Political ◽  
Horn Of Africa ◽  
Commercial Activity ◽  
Access To Finance ◽  
Domestic Use ◽  
Emerging Powers

This chapter argues that the charcoal trade exposes Somalia’s political economy as a driver of persistent conflict fueled by competing local, regional, and international interests. Of particular note is the tendency of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to buy Somalia’s charcoal, whether licit or illicit, for domestic use: such commercial activity contributes to the country’s regressive imbalances. At the same time, GCC states jockeying for geopolitical influence across the Horn of Africa increases the uneven spread of resources and access to finance for Somalia’s leaders. This process has fed the political elite’s insatiable appetite for personal patronage and has produced a nexus of competing rivalries that further destabilizes Somalia and the broader Red Sea region. This chapter studies the use of one natural resource, charcoal, and its trans-boundary trade as a vehicle to illustrate how Somalia’s ties to the GCC states—and the broader Islamic or Arab world—are being strengthened. The chapter concludes that this growing proximity is both offering beneficial forms of assistance and support, as well as proving to be a factor for destabilization at a time when Somalia is becoming of increasing strategic concern for Western and emerging powers.

scholarly journals Implementation of Mining Affairs in Palu City from a Political Economy Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Intam Kurnia
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Habitat Degradation ◽  
Mining Industry ◽  
Mineral Resources ◽  
Environmental Security ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Human Rights Abuses

The detrimental impacts of mining include habitat degradation, contamination of the water, human rights abuses and the denying of the nature of common property. Several countries' experience indicates that natural-resource production, which is only exploitable, often ends in disappointment, both economically and environmentally. Although the mining industry still has the potential to improve welfare. Government regulations have indicated the division of authority to regions to be able to regulate themselves autonomously. So that way the people's wishes should be well appreciated with provisions that are not detrimental to society at large but still maintain environmental security, both politically and geographically. Since the mineral resources which is held is properly and wisely handled and can be a resource for enhancing the community's wellbeing

The Political Economy of the Natural Resource Paradox

2011 ◽  
pp. 39-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naazneen H. Barma ◽  
Kai Kaiser ◽  
Tuan Minh Le ◽  
Lorena Viñuela
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
The Political

The Political Economy of Policy Volatility in Latin America

2014 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Doyle
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Resource Rents ◽  
Natural Resource Rents

AbstractWhy are some Latin American states plagued by persistent policy volatility while the policies of others remain relatively stable? This article explores the political economy of natural resource rents and policy volatility across Latin America. It argues that, all else equal, resource rents will create incentives for political leaders, which will result in repeated episodes of policy volatility. This effect, however, will depend on the structure of political institutions. Where political institutions fail to provide a forum for intertemporal exchange among political actors, natural resource rents will result in increased levels of policy volatility. Alternatively, where political institutions facilitate agreement among actors, resource rents will be conducive to policy stability. This argument is tested on a measure of policy volatility for 18 Latin American economies between 1993 and 2008. The statistical tests provide support for the argument.

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