scholarly journals Rents to riches?: the political economy of natural resource-led development

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (11) ◽  
pp. 49-6399-49-6399
Author(s):  
Ilya Gridneff

This chapter argues that the charcoal trade exposes Somalia’s political economy as a driver of persistent conflict fueled by competing local, regional, and international interests. Of particular note is the tendency of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to buy Somalia’s charcoal, whether licit or illicit, for domestic use: such commercial activity contributes to the country’s regressive imbalances. At the same time, GCC states jockeying for geopolitical influence across the Horn of Africa increases the uneven spread of resources and access to finance for Somalia’s leaders. This process has fed the political elite’s insatiable appetite for personal patronage and has produced a nexus of competing rivalries that further destabilizes Somalia and the broader Red Sea region. This chapter studies the use of one natural resource, charcoal, and its trans-boundary trade as a vehicle to illustrate how Somalia’s ties to the GCC states—and the broader Islamic or Arab world—are being strengthened. The chapter concludes that this growing proximity is both offering beneficial forms of assistance and support, as well as proving to be a factor for destabilization at a time when Somalia is becoming of increasing strategic concern for Western and emerging powers.


2011 ◽  
pp. 39-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naazneen H. Barma ◽  
Kai Kaiser ◽  
Tuan Minh Le ◽  
Lorena Viñuela

2014 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Doyle

AbstractWhy are some Latin American states plagued by persistent policy volatility while the policies of others remain relatively stable? This article explores the political economy of natural resource rents and policy volatility across Latin America. It argues that, all else equal, resource rents will create incentives for political leaders, which will result in repeated episodes of policy volatility. This effect, however, will depend on the structure of political institutions. Where political institutions fail to provide a forum for intertemporal exchange among political actors, natural resource rents will result in increased levels of policy volatility. Alternatively, where political institutions facilitate agreement among actors, resource rents will be conducive to policy stability. This argument is tested on a measure of policy volatility for 18 Latin American economies between 1993 and 2008. The statistical tests provide support for the argument.


2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-443
Author(s):  
Professor D.D. Tewari

Economic Change, Government and Natural Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Change in Southern Africa, London: Earthscan Publications, 2001, 168 pp.


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