Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Dicks
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation

scholarly journals Transaksi Pihak Berelasi: Kompensasi Manajemen Kunci, Kinerja Akuntansi, dan Multiple Large Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 877
Author(s):  
Gandy Wahyu Maulana Zulma ◽  
Fitri Chairunnisa ◽  
Azolla Degita Azis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Executive Management ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Research Period ◽  
Positive Effect

The aim of this study is to examine whether multiple large shareholders held by the company can affect the relation between accounting performance and executive compensation, using panel data of all publicly company in Indonesia (except financialand mining industries) with the research period 2017-2019. The result shows that the existence of 2nd largest shareholders that owns more than 10% stocks and also if the board has representation from 2nd largest shareholders in the company, it can reduce the positive effect of accounting performance to executive compensation. This research findings could be as an additional literature in financial accounting and corporate governance area, and also for practitioners in Indonesia that if a firm has good controlling function from multiple large shareholders, it can reduce the opportunistic discretion from executive management if the company has performance evaluation based on earnings.

scholarly journals The role of corporate governance in executive compensation system

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-479
Author(s):  
Yusuf Mohammed Nulla
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Research Study ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Pearson Correlation ◽  
New York Stock Exchange ◽  
Statistical Regression ◽  
Toronto Stock Exchange ◽  
York Stock Exchange

This research study explores the relationship between the executive compensation and corporate governance among the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX/S&P) companies from 2005 to 2010. The quantitative research method was selected for this research study. The eighty largest companies from the New York Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange were selected. The random sample method was used to select the two populations from each index. The research question for this research study was: is there a relationship between CEO cash compensation and corporate governance among the Toronto Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange companies. The four statistical regression models found that there was a weak relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation among the TSX/S&P and the NYSE populations. Also, the Pearson correlation results indicated that the corporate governance has a minimal role towards the determination of the executive compensation

Positive Corporate Governance and its Implications for Executive Compensation

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (12) ◽  
pp. 1777-1804 ◽  
Author(s):  
James McConvill
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Negative Perception ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Exponential Increase ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Perception

As a result of a series of high-profile corporate collapses worldwide, along with regular reporting of shareholder money being spent on corporate jets, executive golf days and increasingly excessive executive compensation arrangements, the common perception is that the executives of our largest corporations are driven by self-interest with little regard for what is best for the corporation. Due to this negative perception, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of laws, rules and guidelines setting in place a heightened standard of corporate governance best practice. Without such regulation, it is believed, another collapse or scandal is inevitable. In this article, I dispute this reasoning. In my view if we embrace “positive corporate governance”, in which the positive strengths and virtues of company executives are emphasised, we can move towards an environment in which heavy regulation is replaced by positive corporate norms inside the corporation. I then apply my approach of positive corporate governance to address one of the most significant issues confronting corporate regulation at present- how to deal with the rapid increase in executive compensation in our largest corporations. I suggest that the dominant methodology of pay for performance is ultimately flawed.

scholarly journals A Literature Review of the Perspectives of CEO Pay: An Analysis of Issues and Controversies

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Faitira Manuere ◽  
Precious Hove
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
The Core ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Conceptual Background

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on various theories that are used in organisations today to determine executive compensation. This paper analyses the relevance of the theories that are used to determine CEO compensation in modern corporations. The paper makes an attempt to review extensively the literature on CEO compensation. This paper looks at the concerns of sixteen theories of executive compensation. This paper further analyses the special features that are associated with CEO pay. These features help us to understand the problems that experts on executive pay experience when they try to define the exact CEO pay when compared to other rewards that are non financial. The drivers of executive pay are quantified and qualified in order to provide the conceptual background needed to understand the core factors that determine executive pay. Therefore the role of institutional investors in driving managerial salary is explored in detail. Finally, the effects of firm size and good corporate governance on executive pay are carefully analysed.

The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 313-342
Author(s):  
Claudia Ascherl ◽  
Liesa Schrand ◽  
Wolfgang Schaefers ◽  
Sofia Dermisi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation

Bank Governance

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Armour
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effect ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Shareholder Primacy ◽  
Management Agency ◽  
Bank Managers ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Governance Tools

According to a common narrative, the failure of banks in the financial crisis reflected poor corporate governance practices, as well as inadequate prudential regulatory safeguards. Yet it turns out that the “best” governance practices according to ordinary standards were the ones that did worst during the financial crisis. In the period leading up to the financial crisis, it was believed that regulation would cause banks to internalize the costs of their activities, meaning that what maximized bank shareholders’ returns would also be in the interests of society. Consequently, large banks used the same governance tools as non-financial companies to minimize shareholder-management agency costs, namely independent boards, shareholder rights, the shareholder primacy norm, the threat of takeovers, and equity-based executive compensation. Unfortunately, such tools had the adverse effect of encouraging bank managers to take excessive risks. Consequently, a significant rethink about the way in which banks are governed is required.

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