Environmental Security: United Nations Doctrine for Managing Environmental Issues in Military Actions. Volume 2. Selected International Treaties, Conventions and Protocols that Address Environment-Related Issues. Selected International Organizations Relevant to Environmental Security

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe B. Sills ◽  
Jerome C. Glenn ◽  
Theodore J. Gordon ◽  
Renat Perelet
2021 ◽  
pp. 280-281
Author(s):  
Martin Wight

In this note Wight provided a brief survey of institutions for the conquest and cession of territories, illustrated by examples in European history since the fifteenth century. Some legal and political forms concealed de facto conquest and cession to spare the amour propre of the losing party and thereby minimize its humiliation. In some cases, enfeoffment combined conquest with continuing vassal status. Other methods of saving face and bargaining over status included granting an imperial vicariate, diplomatically evading the issue, camouflaging the cession, and making the cession conditional. Conquest and cession became more direct and undisguised with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, if not earlier. Since the eighteenth century, however, the consent of the residents of the territory to be ceded has become a more prominent issue. Since 1919 disregard for previous approaches to conquest and cession has led to new political and legal frameworks on recognition involving national policies such as the Stimson Doctrine, international treaties such as the Kellogg–Briand Pact, and international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations.


Author(s):  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Necip ARMAN

Abstract The performance of Turkey in 2020 in terms of environmental security is examined in this study. Despite Turkey’s adoption of many international treaties about environmental issues, it is concluded that Turkey’s environmental performance in 2020 was very low. The research uses the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) and the Combating Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) to access environmental security assessments. With the above results, it has been indicated that ecosystem vitality, biodiversity and habitat, 􀏐isheries, ef􀏐icient use of energy, and climate policies are the areas where the country performs the least. To add, The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization of Turkey has underlined that water pollution is the most important environmental problem in Turkey. Moreover, the fact that Turkey is one of seven countries that have not rati􀏐ied the Paris Climate Agreement is determined as a major issue of environmental security. Keywords: Human security, environmental security, Paris Climate Agreement, Environmental Performance Index (EPI), Combating Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI).


Global Jurist ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Lempert

The article offers an easy-to-use indicator for scholars and practitioners to measure whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and government policies and projects meet the criteria for “democracy” that have been established by various international treaties and that are recognized by experts in the field. Use of this indicator on more than a dozen standard interventions funded today by international development banks, United Nations organizations, country donors, and NGOs reveals that most of the major actors in the field of development are actually failing to promote democracy and good governance and points to the specific areas where they need to improve in order to fulfill democracy, governance and rights criteria. This article also offers a sample test of the indicator using the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) as a case study.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199756
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Alex Baturo

When political principals send agents to international organizations, those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet, various types of country representatives appear on the international stage, including permanent representatives as well as more overtly “political” government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric. In addition, career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the United Nations. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents’ rhetoric at the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at international organizations. Points for practitioners Delegations to international organizations do not “speak with one voice.” This article illustrates that permanent representatives to the United Nations display more characteristics of bureaucratic culture than do other delegates from the same country. For practitioners, it is important to realize that the manner in which certain classes of international actors “conduct business” can differ markedly. These differences in tone—even among delegates from the same principal—can impact the process of negotiation and debate.


1985 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Paul F. Diehl ◽  
Michael J. Montgomery

Simulation is an increasingly popular pedagogical device; much of the recent literature on the theory and practice of political science instruction attests to this. Probably the most popular simulation device is called model United Nations. In recent articles in Teaching Political Science and NEWS for Teachers of Political Science, William Hazelton and James Jacob have described Model United Nations in glowing terms, focusing on one particular conference and completely ignoring the rest of the 200 or more conferences held annually across the United States.Like Jacob and Hazelton, we recognize the great potential value of United Nations simulations in trying to illuminate the often confusing politics of international organizations. As former participants and directors of these programs, however, we are keenly aware of the shortcomings and difficulties associated with the existing structure of model U.N. programs.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172097433
Author(s):  
Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir ◽  
Ronny Patz ◽  
Klaus H Goetz

In recent decades, many international organizations have become almost entirely funded by voluntary contributions. Much existing literature suggests that major donors use their funding to refocus international organizations’ attention away from their core mandate and toward serving donors’ geostrategic interests. We investigate this claim in the context of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), examining whether donor influence negatively impacts mandate delivery and leads the organization to direct expenditures more toward recipient countries that are politically, economically, or geographically salient to major donors. Analyzing a new dataset of UNHCR finances (1967–2016), we find that UNHCR served its global mandate with considerable consistency. Applying flexible measures of collective donor influence, so-called “influence-weighted interest scores,” our findings suggest that donor influence matters for the expenditure allocation of the agency, but that mandate-undermining effects of such influence are limited and most pronounced during salient refugee situations within Europe.


Author(s):  
Michal Parizek ◽  
Matthew D Stephen

Abstract Although international organizations (IOs) and their secretariats play important roles in international politics, we know surprisingly little about their staffing composition and the factors that shape it. What accounts for the national composition of the secretariats of IOs? We theorize that the national composition of international secretariats is shaped by three factors: the desire by powerful states for institutional control, a commonly shared interest in a secretariat's functional effectiveness, and, increasingly, a need for secretariats to be seen as legitimate by being representative of the global population. Building on recent constructivist literature, we argue that IOs face increasing normative pressure to be representative in their staffing patterns. Using panel regression, we assess our argument with a new dataset covering states’ representation in the secretariats of thirty-five United Nations system bodies from 1997 to 2015. The results indicate that while functional effectiveness plays a significant and stable role, international secretariats have become increasingly representative of the global population. Moreover, this has come primarily at the expense of the over-representation of powerful states. This shift from power to representation is particularly strong in large IOs with high political and societal visibility. When it comes to IO secretariats, representativeness (increasingly) matters.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas L. Tookey

Environmental challenges, resulting from either a scarcity of natural resources or environmental degradation, may contribute to security risks in Central Asia. An encouraging sign is the recent attention of the governments of Central Asia, civil society groups and international organizations to these environmental security issues. Their efforts indicate that by working together to prevent conflicts caused by environmental problems, cooperation among the countries of Central Asia may expand. Both short and long-term obstacles must be overcome if these groups are to ensure that environmental stresses do not lead to security concerns.


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